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Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 1320-18 Filed 01/03/24 Page 29 of 40 absolute privilege to protect attorneys’ statements made in communications that are preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.502(2); see also McCullough v. Kubiak, 158 So. 3d 739, 740 (Fla. 4" DCA, 2015). A waiver of the attorney-client privilege occurs only if the client voluntarily discloses in court the substance of a communication with her attorney. See, e.g., Delap v. State, 440 So.2d 1242, 1247 (Fla. 1983) (criminal defendant sought to use in court favorably testimony from his investigator while blocking inquiry into other testimony). No waiver occurs when the client merely discloses facts which were part of the communication with the client’s attorney. See Koon v. State, 463 So.2d 201, 203-04 (Fla. 1985); see also Taylor v. State, 855 So.2d 1, 26 n.29 (Fla. 2003). Thus, the privilege attaches to the communication with counsel, not to the underlying facts. Brookings v. State, 495 So.2d 135, 139 (Fla. 1986); see also Lynch y. State, 2 So.3d 47, 66 (Fla. 2008).'” As a result, allegations that Giuffre disclosed to third parties the same facts that she may have related to Cassell and Edwards, without any evidence that she disclosed the substance of her confidential consultation with Edwards and Cassell, cannot overcome her privilege.'® To hold otherwise would eviscerate the attorney-client privilege. Such a ruling would mean that every time an attorney filed a declaration by his client that contained the factual basis for the client’s claim, the opposing party would have the right to examine all privileged communications. Defendant has not cited any authority either in Florida (or elsewhere) to ” New York state privilege law is to the same effect. See, e.g., Niesig v. Team I, 76 N.Y .2d 363, 372, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1034 (1990) (because “the privilege applies only to confidential communications with counsel (see, CPLR 4503), it does not immunize the underlying factual information . . . from disclosure to an adversary’’). 'S As an illustration, Defendant notes that in 2011 Ms. Giuffre gave an interview to the Daily Mail. Mot. to Compel at 15. But Defendant does not explain how that interview disclosed any attorney-client communications. And because any such disclosures would have been extrajudicial, they would be narrowly construed. Jn re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 1987). 22