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Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 1320-18 Filed 01/03/24 Page 32 of 40 who is telling the truth. None of this creates any need for Defendant to force Ms. Giuffre to reveal confidential communications. Il. MS. GIUFFRE DID NOT WAIVE HER ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE BY DENYING FABRICATED EVICENCE DURING HER DEPOSITION. Defendant spends significant time arguing that Ms. Giuffre’s answers to several deposition questions about the absence of any communications from Cassell and Edwards that she provide false information constituted a waiver of attorney client privilege. Mot. to Compel at 11 (arguing that “never” answer to the question “Has Brad [Edwards] ever pressured you or encouraged you in any way or under any circumstances at any time to provide false information about Jeffrey Epstein” constituted a waiver of attorney-client privilege). While the arguments above are sufficient to dispose of this claim, it is worth emphasizing several additional points about this specific testimony. First, disclosing the absence of communication is not the same as exposing any communication. It is a fundamental requirement of a waiver argument that a communication be exposed, see Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.502 (extending privilege to a “communication between lawyer and client”), not the absence of such a communication. See Montanez v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 135 So. 3d 510, 512-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (rejecting argument that client waived her attorney-client privilege by stating that an interrogatory answer was not “her” answer because this did not disclose the substance of her communications with her attorney). Cf Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 591, 602, 691 P.2d 642, 647 (Cal. 1984) (“Relevant case law makes it clear that mere disclosure of the fact that a communication between client and attorney had occurred does not amount to disclosure of the specific content of that communication, and as such does not necessarily constitute a waiver of the privilege.”). 25