Giuffre_Maxwell_Batch1_p00590.png

Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 1320-27 Filed 01/03/24 Page 12 of 15 22), the Second Circuit’s seminal decision of LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 1997), squarely upheld the drawing of adverse inferences based on a non-party’s invocation of a Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The Second Circuit instructed that, the circumstances of given case, rather than status of particular nonparty witness, determines whether nonparty witness' invocation of privilege against self-incrimination is admissible in course of civil litigation. Jd. at122-23. The Second Circuit also held that, in determining whether nonparty witness’ invocation of privilege against self-incrimination in course of civil litigation and drawing of adverse inferences is admissible, court may consider the following nonexclusive factors: (1) nature of witness’ relationship with and loyalty to party; (2) degree of control which party has vested in witness in regard to key facts and subject matter of litigation; (3) whether witness is pragmatically noncaptioned party in interest and whether assertion of privilege advances interests of witness and party in outcome of litigation; and (4) whether witness was key figure in litigation and played controlling role in respect to its underlying aspects. Id. at 124-25. Ms. Giuffre will be able to establish that all these factors tip decisively in favor of allowing an adverse inference. Accordingly, her efforts to depose Epstein, Marcinkova, and Kellen seek important information that will be admissible at trial. I. MS. GIUFFRE’S REQUEST IS TIMELY. Defendant also argues that this motion is somehow “premature.” Defendant’s Resp. at 2-3. Clearly, if Ms. Giuffre had waited to file her motion until later, Defendant would have argued until the matter came too late. The motion is proper at this time because, as of the date of this filing, fact discovery closes in 17 days (although Ms. Giuffre has recently filed a motion for a 30-day extension of the deadline). In order to give the Court the opportunity to rule as far in advance as possible — thereby permitting counsel for both side to schedule the remaining depositions — Ms. Giuffre brings the motion now. She also requires a ruling in advance so that 8