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Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 1325-14 Filed 01/04/24 Page 21 of 30 Regarding photographs, counsel for Ms. Giuffre has gone to considerable expense to recover boxes that Ms. Giuffre thought may contain photographs, including paying approximately $600.00 for shipping of the boxes to ensure production of any recent information. Accordingly, Defendant articulates no legitimate complaint in this section of her brief. LEGAL ARGUMENT I. DEFENDANT CANNOT SHOW NON-COMPLIANCE, AND HAS PUT FORTH NO COLORABLE LEGAL ARGUMENT FOR SANCTIONS Sanctions are not appropriate in this case because Defendant cannot show non- compliance. Through the normal course of discovery, Ms. Giuffre produced her medical providers to Defendant, as Defendant admits in her moving brief. Defendant’s complaint boils down to the fact that Ms. Giuffre remembered at deposition two providers (Ms. Lightfoot and Dr. Donahue) that she did not recall when compiling her long list of providers in response to Defendant’s interrogatory four days prior. That does not constitute non-compliance. That is not sanctionable behavior. And, Defendant cannot cite any case in which a court found differently. Additionally, though Defendant attempts to ascribe blame to Ms. Giuffre for any medical records that have not been sent by providers (or medical records that may not exist), the uncontested fact is that Ms. Giuffre has executed releases for all of the providers Defendant requested. Again, Defendant can point to no case in which sanctions were awarded over medical records where the party signed all applicable releases. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion should be denied.'” ? What does constitute sanctionable behavior is testimonial obduracy that includes “denying memory of the events under inquiry,” a tactic Defendant took in response to a multitude of questions at her deposition, as more fully briefed in Ms. Giuffre’s Motion to Compel Defendant to Answer Deposition Questions (DE 143), granted by this Court on June 20, 2016. See In re Weiss, 703 F.2d 653, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that “the witness's . . . disclaimers of knowledge or memory, has also been dealt with as contemptuous conduct, warranting sanctions that were coercive, punitive, or both. It has long been the practice of courts viewing such testimony as false and intentionally evasive, and as a sham or subterfuge that purposely avoids 17