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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 206 Filed 04/16/21 Page 7 of 22 direction to the contrary, to override the longstanding principle that criminal statutes of limitations are to be interpreted in favor of repose. Second, Ms. Maxwell’s Motion should be granted for the separate and independent reason that § 3283 does not apply to 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a) or 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), the two Mann Act provisions with which Ms. Maxwell is charged, because neither offense necessarily entails, as an element of the offense, the sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping of a child. While the government attempts to distinguish a long line of Supreme Court cases holding that an “offense” or “crime” that “involves” certain conduct means an offense that necessarily requires or entails that conduct, it fails to cite a single case outside the § 3283 context in which “offense involving” language has been interpreted otherwise—and the cases that have interpreted § 3283 as permitting a fact-based inquiry have failed to consider the voluminous Supreme Court authority to the contrary. Consideration of such authority compels application of § 3283 by reference to the elements of the offense at issue, and even under the definition of “sexual abuse” the government proposes, none of the elements of either § 2422(a) or § 2423(a) constitutes sexual abuse. I. The 2003 Amendment Does Not Apply Retroactively. The government does not dispute that Landgraf is the appropriate framework for determining whether a statute applies retroactively. Opp. 27. Under Landgraf, the first step is “to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach”; if it has, there is no need to proceed further. 551 U.S. at 280. Ifit has not, the court must determine “whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.” Jd. DOJ-OGR-00003659