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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 206 Filed 04/16/21 Page 10 of 22 It will frequently be true, as petitioner and amici forcefully argue here, that retroactive application of a new statute would vindicate its purpose more fully. That consideration, however, is not sufficient to rebut the presumption against retroactivity. Statutes are seldom crafted to pursue a single goal, and compromises necessary to their enactment may require adopting means other than those that would most effectively pursue the main goal. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 285-86 (emphasis added). Thus, it is not anomalous at all that Congress would “exempt[] all past offenders” from the new limitations period, as the government asserts (Opp. 31); to the contrary, the law presumes that past conduct is exempt from legislation. Here, Congress’ clear intent that the 2003 Amendment not be retroactive resolves the Landgraf inquiry in Ms. Maxwell’s favor at step one. Ze Cases applying the 2003 Amendment retroactively are readily distinguishable. While the government cites several cases that have applied the 2003 Amendment retroactively (Opp. 26-27), most of those cases analyzed the issue under the Ex Post Facto Clause and gave little, if any, consideration to congressional intent regarding retroactivity (as opposed to the intent of the amendment itself). In all but one of those cases, no Landgraf analysis was performed, and it does not appear that Congress’ explicit rejection of a retroactivity provision was considered or even raised.’ But the government does not dispute that Landgraf is the appropriate framework—nor can it, given the Second Circuit’s acknowledgment that the retroactivity of the 2003 Amendment must be analyzed under Landgraf. Weingarten v. United States, 865 F.3d 48, 54-58 (2d Cir. 2017). ? No Landgraf analysis was performed, nor was Congress’ rejection of the retroactivity provision discussed, in United States v. Brown, 800 F. App’x 455, 461 (9th Cir. 2020) (discussing issue in a single sentence and referring only to the intent of the amendment generally), cert. denied, No. 20-5064, -- 8.Ct. -- , 2021 WL 78235 (Jan. 11, 2021); United States v. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing only the intent of the amendment generally); United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684-85 (8th Cir. 2005) (no Landgraf analysis or consideration of legislative history), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1007 (2005); United States v. Pierre-Louis, No. 16 Cr. 541 (CM), 2018 WL 4043140, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2018) (addressing only Ex Post Facto clause); or United States v. Sensi, No. 08 Cr. 253, 2010 WL 2351484, at *3 (D. Conn. June 7, 2010) (same). DOJ-OGR-00003662