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From: Justin X Gratz
To: Undisclosed recipients:;
Subject: Eye on the Market, July 13, 2010
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 2010 16:51:20 +0000
Attachments: 7-13-10_-_EOTM_-_5_best_things_about_theilash_crash.pdf
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All eyes are on European bank stress tests, which will be released on July 23. After their release, our European head
strategist Cesar Perez and I will take a look at the results. For European banks, it could serve as an important inflection
point; for U.S. banks, the test results marked the bottom. But in the U.S., the tests incorporated loss assumptions that were
even more severe than losses realized during the worst stretch of the 1930's Depression, and also came at a time when the
global recovery in production was just getting underway. Given the size of the European system, reliance on wholesale
funding, slower trend growth and higher levels of corporate and household debt, stress tests will have to be credible to
prompt money market and bond funds to start providing capital again. Our focus will be on the rigor of loss and GDP
growth assumptions; recently announced decisions to expand the tests to more banks should be seen as a "given".
The 5 best things about the Flash Crash
On May 6 2010, major U.S. market indices dropped by over 9%, with a 7% decline within one 15-minute span, temporarily
evaporating $1 trillion in market capitalization, before recovering. The SEC has not yet determined what caused this
event. In their examinations, the SEC is dealing with a world that has changed a lot from the traditional floor-based outcry
model; the percentage of total volumes executed by floor brokers and specialists fell from 52% in 1999 to 7.5% as of 2007.
That's why the Flash Crash discussion includes a focus on high-frequency trading. Market research estimates that HFT has
grown in the U.S. to 70% of all trades (50%-60% of shares traded). In Japan, HFT is roughly 30% of all trading, and in
Europe, 40%. The broad category of HFT includes funds that employ algorithms to arbitrage away market variances (e.g.,
between exchange traded funds and their component stocks), a benign and helpful function for markets. Other HFTs track
the order flow of other participants to both influence and benefit from it, which engenders a lot more debate.
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11, 2010: 2pm - 4pm
500 Index
1,160
1,150
1,140
1,130
1,120
1,110
1,100
1,090
1,080
1,070
1,060
2:00 PM
3:00PM
Source: Bloomberg.
HFT firms account for a growing share of all trades
%of all trading activity
70% -
60% -
50% -
40% •
30% -
20% -
10%
0%
4:00 FM
2003
2004
2005
2008
2001
2008
2009esi
Source: Cao ital Markets Ad vi sory Partners. AITE Groom Grant Thorton.
There's a postmodern temptation to define all forms of innovation as progress, but there are big differences between
the two. One example: while some forms of genetic engineering are possible, they may also be very undesirable. The
downside to some innovation only becomes apparent over time (overuse of antibiotics which may lead to the survival of
more virulent strains of bacteria; species transplantation that cause disastrous side-effects for local populations). Some
derivatives activity (e.g., CDO-cubed) ended up being innovations with strongly negative aftershocks. You do not have to
be a Luddite to raise questions about undesired consequences of innovation, particularly when financial services are
involved. The debate is not about reversing innovation in electronic trading, but making adjustments along the way.
Why do we care about all of this? As fiduciaries for several hundred billion dollars in client assets, we are very focused
on issues that either raise or detract from market confidence, stability, volatility and perceptions of fairness. With that
background, here are 5 positive developments that have either resulted, or may result, from the May 6 Flash Crash.
Ill Stock-specific circuit breakers. The U.S. has been slow to install circuit breakers on major exchanges, relying instead
on "clearly erroneous trade rules" that cancel trades after the fact. In Asia and Europe, circuit-breakers have been around
for a while. In Asia, trading is restricted outside of pre-specified daily bands of 5%, 10% and 15% (different by market).
In Europe (e.g., Deutsche Bourse), trading is halted for 5 minutes after a 3%-10% move, and then reopened. In the wake of
the Flash Crash, 10% circuit breakers are now applied to a few stocks as part of a pilot program (they have already been
triggered on Citigroup and the Washington Post Company). If we are going to exist in a world with automated robots
doing the lion's share of daily trading, circuit breakers may be needed to prevent unintended and unmanageable
meltdowns.
Another topic under discussion by the SEC: prevent HFTs from having "unfiltered, naked access" to the exchanges by
requiring them to live by the same pre-trade risk management controls that clearing members do. Why? As noted by the
Chicago Fed, "high-frequency trading has the potential to generate errors and losses at a speed and magnitude far greater
than that in a floor or screen-based trading environment".
121 More balance to the HFT discussion. HFT supporters claim they are providers of liquidity to the market, and that
HFT makes U.S. markets more efficient than ever. Suggestions to the contrary have been deemed "utterly laughable" by
firms defending them (see Rosenblatl in sources). However, the Flash Crash highlights the uncertainties around these
assertions. While volumes have tripled in the last few years, there's a big difference between volume and liquidity (the
ability to transact without moving the price). In an industry barometer survey conducted by the Tabb Group in May of this
year, barely half the participants (a) had a high degree of confidence in the US equity market structure; 73% did not believe
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the market structure is "orderly". One of the survey recommendations: HFIk should be required to register as broker-
dealers.
To be sure, there were weaknesses in the old specialist system as well (b). But specialists were required to maintain a fair
and orderly market, and post quotes that were part of the National Best Bid and Offer system; their reputations mattered.
HFTS have no such requirements (no minimum shares or minimum quote times); one proposal would require quotes to be
valid for at least one second. The SEC has broadened the trader reporting system in order to analyze HFT activity more
closely.
[3] Proposals requiring HFTs to act more like the floor specialists they're replacing. With the advent of HFTs,
cancelled orders have soared. Today's ratio of 30 cancelled orders for each one executed means that 97% are cancelled. To
curb abusive practices, some market participants recommend applying a fee to HFTs for an excessive number of
cancelled orders. The increase in cancelled orders is one reason we do not agree that increased order depth on S&P 500
stocks at the NBBO is a clear indication of greater liquidity, as some market research alleges. Quotes pulled within a
nano-second of being posted, and which are part of an algorithmic order detection exercise, don't seem like liquidity
in the traditional sense. Ameritrade's representative on the recent SEC Roundtable referred to this as "opportunistic
liquidity".
HFTs driving order cancellations higher
Ratio of cancelled to executed orders
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Source: NASDAQ ITCH date provided by Knight Capital Grotp.
[4] More discussion around HFT "co-location". Some HFTs co-locate computer servers inside stock exchanges to
minimize the milliseconds (or nanoseconds) required to scan existing orders, and have algorithms act on this information.
Co-location services are offered by many exchanges, including NYSE Euronext, Eurex, ICE and the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange. As trading execution and IPO listing fees declined, exchanges have tried to make up the difference by selling
access to market data. Some exchanges have products which give clients a faster look at quotes, in exchange for a fee. As
a result, some HFTs end up with access to information sooner than institutional or retail investors who rely on more
standard venues (such as SIP Quotes).
The search for co-location benefits has existed forever (in polite company, "order anticipation strategies"). Broker-dealers
in past decades argued that being closer to floor traders on the CBOT was an advantage to their clients. But historical
parallels can lose their meaning when the instruments of battle change: one HFT computer can reportedly decode more
than 5 million messages per second. The Flash Crash has increased the debate around whether co-location confers
advantages to HFTs, and whether there should be obligations and responsibilities that accompany them.
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151 Asset managers learn that "cheapest 0 best". After the NYSE moved to decimalization in 2001, bid-offer spreads
fell almost in half on S&P 500 stocks (less so for the Russell 2000 stocks, where HFTs are less active). Schwab retail
commissions fell from $35 in 2003 to less than $10 in 2009. This trend is confirmed by broader research from the
American Association of Individual Investors. So if the prism of success is bid-offer costs and commissions on individual
trades, the battle has been won.
But is that the right prism to define what makes an optimal marketplace? Part of the HFT industry tracks the order flow of
larger investors who leave electronic footprints (c). Using algorithms which include spraying the tape with thousands of
quotes, the intentions of large investors is ferreted out. This can result in higher trading costs for such investors, and by
extension, their clients, who include 401k investors, and pensioners participating in state and corporate plans. Quantitative
Services Group computes analyses of HFT impacts on execution costs. They estimate that HFT tracking algorithms
can drive execution costs up 1.5 to 3 times, even when institutional investors parcel trades into smaller orders to
avoid detection.
One last point on the Flash Crash. At a June SEC Roundtable dealing with the crash and market structure, the CEO of
Vanguard proposed "depth of book" protection. In plain English: customer orders should get the benefit of the best bids
and offers at multiples prices across exchanges, rather than just the single best quote on one exchange. With the average
trade size having fallen by 70% in the last few years, only protecting the single best bid/offer has become less meaningful.
A "depth of book" rule might prompt traders to post more limit orders and reduce volatility, a view shared by the Tabb
Group survey respondents.
Conclusions
Over the last decade, trading automation coincided with substantial improvements for equity investors. Information is
available more readily, and transactions costs have come down on individual trades. High frequency trading is here to stay,
and parts of the industry contribute to greater efficiencies. But the HFT industry may have gotten ahead of anyone's ability
to understand and monitor its capabilities and consequences. The combination of a singular quest for lower execution costs
and advanced technology may have resulted in a more fragmented marketplace in which liquidity is temporal, and in less
incentive to display limit orders or contribute capital to market-making. The Flash Crash provides a basis for regulators
and market participants to consider these consequences in more detail than they have so far, and make adjustments. As
shown below, confidence in the market has been dented by the latest events, and there's work to be done to restore it.
Confidence that competition among exchanges supports a
more liquid and orderly market, % responding "highly supported'
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
September-2009
May-2010
Source: TABB Group, "Industry Barometer, May 2010.
In its request to improve market structure and sort these issues out, the SEC had this to say:
EFTA00742479
"Where the interests of long-term investors and short-term professional traders diverge, the Commission repeatedly has
emphasized that its duty is to uphold the interests of long-term investors".
On that, we agree 100%.
Michael Cembalest
Chief Investment Officer
J.P. Morgan Private Banking
Notes
(a) The TABB survey included buy side investors, broker-dealers, execution venues, liquidity providers, advisory firms,
consultants and technology providers. Topics included HFT, co-location, trade-at and depth-of-book rules, stub quotes and
large trader reporting rules.
(b) The lowest common denominator argument that specialists didn't do a great job during the 1987 crash simply means
that the proposed registration, pre-trade, naked access and minimum quote controls on HFTs are even more important for
the marketplace.
(c) The proliferation of so-called "dark pools" such as LiquidNet and Pipeline reflect a desire by institutional investors to
avoid detection by HFT algorithms. This may lead to greater market fragmentation.
Sources
"Unintended consequences of market regulation", Tabb Group comments to the SEC, December 8, 2009
"Controlling risk in a lightning-speed trading environment", Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, March 2010
"An in-depth look at high-frequency trading", Rosenblatt Securities, September 2009.
"Equity Thading in the 21st Century", James Angel [Georgetown], Lawrence Harris [USC] and Chester S. Spatt [Carnegie
Mellon University]. USC Marshall School of Business, May 2010.
"Beware of the VWAP Thap", Quantitative Services Group, November 2009.
"Statement of Kevin Cronin", Global Head of Equity Trading at Invesco, to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Market Structure Roundtable, June 2, 2010
"Does Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity?", Terence Hendershott (UC Berkeley), Charles Jones (Columbia Business
School) and Albert Menkveld (VU University, Amsterdam), Journal of Finance, date forthcoming.
Themis Trading response to SEC on S7-02-10, Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, April 2010.
"An analysis of trades by high frequency participants on the London Stock Exchange", Elvis Jarnecic and Mark Snape,
School of Business and Economics, University of Sydney, June 2010
"Statement of George Saute?', Managing Director and Chief Investment Officer, The Vanguard Group, SEC June 2, 2010
Market Structure Roundtable
EFTA00742480
"A wake-up call for America", Grant Thornton Capital Markets Series, November 2009. This paper describes the
"depression in capital markets listings" in the US. They see the IPO listing decline as a consequence of the pendulum
swinging too far in favor of lowering execution costs, and against providing the revenues to support IPO activity.
Domestic listings on all U.S. exchanges declined by 43% from 1996 to 2008.
"TABB Group Says Confidence Level in US Equity Market Structure is Highly Polarized Across the Marketplace since the
May 6 Market Crash"; press release following May survey
"The Shrinking New York Stock Exchange Floor and the Hybrid Market", Terrence Hendershott [Berkeley] and Pamela C.
Moulton {Fordham], October, 2007
SEC
Securities and Exchange Commission
CDO
Collateralized debt obligation
LIFT
High frequency trading
NBBO
National Best Bid and Best Offer
CBOT
Chicago Board of Trade
SIP
Securities Information Processor
IPO
Initial Public Offering
The material contained herein is intended as a general market commentary. Opinions expressed herein are those of Michael Cembalest and may differ from those of
other J.P. Morgan employees and affiliates. This information in no way constitutes J.P. Morgan research and. hould not be treated as such. Further, the views expressed
herein may differ from that contained in J.P. Morgan research reports. The above summary/prices/quoteilstatistics have been obtained liom sources deemed to be
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EFTA00742481
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