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Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 1328-6 Filed 01/05/24 Page 27 of 32 documents are publicly accessible. And while the relatively recent history of modern civil discovery practice means there is no ancient common-law analogue to the contemporary discovery motion, “[t]his absence, of course, is not surprising, for compelled discovery is a child of the first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted in 1938.” Mokhiber, 537 A.2d at 1111. “It would make little sense to shut off access for what is, practically speaking, a new kind of judicial process just because that particular procedure did not exist at common law. Instead, the public should enjoy the right to view new kinds of proceedings when they are like traditional ones in this significant respect: that access will serve the same values and policies which underlie” the public right of access. /d. at 1112. As to the logic prong of the Second Circuit’s test, it is clear that public monitoring has an important role to play here. Ms. Giuffre’s allegations against Professor Dershowitz have been the subject of significant public interest and have been discussed at length in an array of international news stories. Indeed, in the CVRA Action, Ms. Giuffre’s own counsel cited “strong current media interest in the case” to oppose sealing the pleadings, pointing to Ms. Churcher’s stories among others as examples. Doe v. United States, No. 08 Civ. 80736 (S.D. Fla.), ECF No. 51, at 7. “The issues involved are manifestly ones of public concern and therefore ones which the public has an interest in overseeing.” Erie Cnty., 763 F.3d at 242. Because experience and logic dictate that the First Amendment right of access applies to the Requested Documents, their continued sealing would only be permissible on the basis of “specific, on-the-record findings that higher values necessitate a narrowly tailored sealing.” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. Here, no such findings have ever been made; indeed, the Court has granted boilerplate sealing applications with no findings or judicial scrutiny whatsoever. See, e.g., ECF No. 254. There would be no basis to find that continuing secrecy is warranted, let alone “essential to preserve higher values.” 21