Giuffre_Maxwell_Batch4_p00157.png

Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 1328-6 Filed 01/05/24 Page 28 of 32 I. ALTERNATIVELY, THE PROTECTIVE ORDER SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO PERMIT DISCLOSURE OF THE REQUESTED DOCUMENTS Even where discovery materials are found not to be judicial documents, that does not automatically entitle them to confidential treatment. See Vazquez v. City of N.Y., No. 10 Civ. 6277, 2014 WL 11510954, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2014). Here, although Professor Dershowitz is in rightful possession of the Requested Documents, he is prohibited from disseminating them by the parties’ stipulated, blanket Protective Order. See Dershowitz Decl. Ex. L. That order permits the parties to designate documents as confidential without particularized judicial scrutiny, which is how the Requested Documents became subject to a protective order in the first instance. Because there is no basis for judicial protection of the Requested Documents, the Protective Order should be modified to permit its disclosure. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) permits issuance of a protective order only upon “good cause shown,” and requires that such orders issue only “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” “[I]f good cause is not shown, the discovery materials in question should not receive judicial protection and therefore would be open to the public for inspection.” Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). A protective order requires “particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements” showing the harm that would result from disclosure. Louissier v. Universal Music Grp., Inc., 214 F.R.D. 174, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The Second Circuit’s general rule that a protective order should not be modified “absent a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need,” S.E.C. v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 2001), applies only when the parties have reasonably relied on the protective order in producing discovery. That is not the case here, where the protective order is a sweeping and generic stipulation permitting the parties, 22