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Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 1328-18 Filed 01/05/24 Page 23 of 50 SSC a OO —CSC“C“(‘( HE he tail is already wagging the dog regarding Ms. Giuffre’s search for, and production of, her medical records from 1999 to the present, the overwhelming majority of which are not at all relevant to this defamation case. Again, this Court held that Ms. Giuffre does not have to disclose her pre-1999 medical records, and Defendant gives no reason to disturb that ruling. Defendant is thus estopped from making this argument. 3. Interrogatory No. 13 is Disallowed Under New York Law a in granted some medical discovery is not unlimited under New York law. See, e.g., Manessis v. New York City Dep’t of Transp., No. 02 CIV. 359SASDF, 2002 WL 31115032, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2002) (concluding that “ability to pursue discovery regarding [plaintiff's] medical records should be limited in some manner”); Evanko v. Electronic Systems Assoc., Inc., No. 91 Civ. 2851, 1993 WL 14458 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1993) (applying the New York state physician-patient privilege, and holding that where plaintiff claimed that she suffered emotional distress, defendants did not have “a license to rummage through all aspects of the plaintiff’s life in search of a possible source of stress or distress,” including plaintiff’s medical records) (emphasis added); Wachtman v. Trocaire College, 532 N.Y.S.2d 943, 944 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (holding that the scope of a waiver of the physician-patient privilege in personal injury cases is “limited and does not permit discovery of information involving unrelated illnesses and treatment”). Even in a personal injury action (as opposed to a defamation action), the opposing party does not have carte blanche access to all medical records. See Sgambellone v. 17