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Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 1328-41 Filed 01/05/24 Page 15 of 31 the redactions were agreed to by the parties, they were solely at Defendant’s request.”’ Indeed, this Court temporarily placed the entire docket under seal. June 23, 2016, Order. DE 251. Under these rulings, both parties designated hundreds of pages of materials confidential under the Court’s Order. IV. ARGUMENT A. Legal Standard The Court may deny Dershowitz’s motion without even reaching the merits of whether the contested documents are judicial documents, which they absolutely are not. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3); Liz Claiborne, Inc. v. Mademoiselle Knitwear, Inc., 1996 WL 346352, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1996) (Sweet, J.) (denying leave to intervene); Levin v. U.S., 633 Fed. Appx. 69, 70 (2nd Cir. 2016) (affirming district court’s denial of motion to intervene, explaining “[b]ecause of the fact-intensive nature of an intervention decision, we review for ‘abuse of discretion’ a district court's order denying intervention . . . by permission.”). Accordingly, this Court can deny Dershowitz’s motion on the grounds that taking these documents to the media would prejudice Ms. Giuffre and because, having sat on the documents for months, the motion is untimely.”* Dershowitz ’s motion mentions, then proceeds to ignore, the policy rationale that underlies both the First Amendment and common law right of access to judicial documents. Both ?7 Without a good faith basis, Defendant proposed redacting this Court’s reference to Jeffrey Epstein’s name (44 times) and the Court’s reference to Alan Dershowitz’s name (10 times) from this Court’s Order. DE 135 Ms. Giuffre made no objection to Defendant’s self-serving maneuver to avoid being closely associated with Epstein and Dershowitz in the public eye. ?8 The Court should not even reach the substance of Dershowitz’s motion, as he has failed to meet the requirements for permissive intervention, which, as Dershowitz admits, include timeliness. MasterCard Intern. Inc. v. Visa Intern. Service Ass'n, Inc., 471 F.3d 377, 390 (2d Cir. 2006). In MasterCard the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion for permissive intervention on timeliness grounds. That decision is highly persuasive here. First, Dershowitz has known of his potential “interest” in this case long before it was filed in September of 2015, as evidenced by the email communications between Dershowtiz and Defendant the Court reviewed in its in camera review before ordering Defendant to produce them. Yet Dershowitz waited until after discovery closed and until after he was safe from receiving a notice of deposition in this matter, before he filed his intervention motion. Unsurprisingly, his motion is devoid of any claim that his motion is timely, because such an argument could never succeed given Dershowitz ’s long-held knowledge of Ms. Giuffre and her allegations, the disposition of this case, and the fact that he sat on these documents for months before seeking relief. 10