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Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 1328-41 Filed 01/05/24 Page 26 of 31 Despite Dershowitz’s argument, the Protective Order, entered “[u]pon a showing of good cause,” was not improvidently granted. (DE 62 at p.1). Indeed, even after the entry of the Protective Order, this Court has articulated its concern for preserving the protections of the Protective Order: “I want to be sure that we can enforce the confidential aspect of that 34 . ”™ Indeed, “once a discovery agreement, and I think that could be critical down the line. protective order is in place, the applicable standard requires plaintiff seeking to modify the order to show improvidence in the grant of the protective order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need.” Jn re September 11 Litigation, 262 F.R.D. 274 (S.D. N.Y. 2009). Dershowitz’s attempts to claim improvidence, carelessness, or shortsightedness of this Court in granting the Protective Order are unavailing. To the contrary, this Court has, twice, found the case warrants a stringent Protective Order, and has specifically expressed concern for its ongoing efficacy.** Dershowitz cannot point to a single reason why the Protective Order was improvidently granted other than the fact that it hinders the ability of him, a third party, to select certain documents to use in a pre-trial smear campaign against one of the parties. Ms. Giuffre submits that one of the merits of the Protective Order is that it forecloses a pre-trial any media circus (created by either side) which would taint the jury pool. 2. The Parties and Deponents in This Case Have Reasonably Relied Upon the Protective Order The Second Circuit has been hesitant to permit modifications that might “unfairly disturb the legitimate expectations of the parties or deponents.” Dorsett v. County of Nassau, 289 F.R.D. 54, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). Indeed, “[i]t is presumptively unfair for courts to modify protective orders which assure confidentiality and upon which the parties have reasonably relied.” /d., 289 F.R.D. at 64 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (denying motion to lift * April 21, 2016, Hearing Transcript at 6:24-7:6. (McCawley Dec. at Exhibit 19). * March 17, 2016, Hearing Transcript at 4:25-5:1, supra; April 21, 2016, Hearing Transcript at 6:24-7:6, supra 21