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Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 1328-41 Filed 01/05/24 Page 29 of 31 Nixon, the Supreme Court warned that lower courts should “exercise an informed discretion as to the release” of materials, because, “[o]therwise, there would exhibit a danger that the court could become a partner in the use of the subpoenaed material to gratify private spite or promote public scandal, with no corresponding assurance of public benefit.” Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 98 8.Ct. at 1315, 435 U.S. at 603 (internal citations and quotations omitted).Under Nixon, this Court should not allow itself to be Dershowitz’s partner in gratifying his private spite and promoting public scandal that would necessarily prejudice Ms. Giuffre.*° 4. Under This Court’s Order, Non-Parties Cannot Challenge Confidentiality Designations and Dershowitz has Already Agreed to be Bound by the Parties’ Confidentiality Designations in Exchange for Receipt of Documents The Protective Order (DE 62) does not allow non-parties, like Dershowitz, to make a challenge to the confidentiality designations or the efficacy of the Order. To the contrary, the Protective Order only states that parties can object to the confidentiality designations: “A party may object to the designation of particular CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION by giving written notice to the party designating the disputed information . . . it shall be the obligation the party designating the information as CONFIDENTIAL to file an appropriate motion requesting that the Court determine whether the disputed information should be subject to the terms of this Protective Order.” (DE 62 at § 11, p. 4). This Court’s Protective Order does not allow for non- parties to challenge these designations. Accordingly, Dershowitz cannot challenge the designations under this Order. *° Similarly, under applications to intervene under Rule 24(a), numerous courts have declined to allow a mere “reputational” interest to justify intervention. Calloway v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 115 F.R.D. 73, 74 (M.D. Ga. 1987) (“interest in his reputation alone . . . does not constitute the required interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the present action necessary to allow intervention”); Flynn v. Hubbard, 82 F.2d 1084, 1093 (1st Cir. 1986) (“the church “merely claim[ed] a generalized injury to reputation [that] identifies no legal detriment arising from a default judgment against Hubbard.”); Edmondson v. State of Neb. ex. rel. Meyer, 383 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1967) (“The mere fact that Edmondson’s reputation is thereby injured is not enough [to support intervention].”); Forsyth County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2009 WL 1312511, at *2 (N.D. Ga. May 8, 2009) (interest in protecting its reputation . . . is not direct, substantive, or derived from a legal right”). 24