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Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 1331-27 Filed 01/05/24 Page 8 of 11 Rule 37(a)(3) requires that a motion to compel the production of a document be grounded on the existence of an unsatisfied request for production. So too does Local Civil Rule 37.1. Plaintiff has identified no unsatisfied request for production. That violates both rules. Her motion must be denied on this basis alone, as a legion of cases confirms. See, e.g., Hassan v. Town of Brookhaven, No. 13-CV-4544 JMA SIL, 2015 WL 3455108, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015) (rejecting motion to compel: “Even more troubling, it appears that Hassan did not prepare or serve any requests for discovery in this action, and simply made a motion to compel as his first and only method of obtaining discovery.”); Brown v. Chappius, No. 13-CV-00105A F, 2015 WL 5316356, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2015) (denying motion to compel production of documents: “Plaintiff has failed to serve formal discovery demands requesting such materials.”). The meritlessness of a motion to compel combined with failure to confer warrants denial and a sanction. Window Headquarters, Inc. v. Mat Basic Four, Inc., No. 91 CIV. 1816 (MBM), 1996 WL 63046, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1996) (“Because the motion was without basis and was filed by Fagan without consulting his adversary, Fagan will pay to counsel for Ventech a sanction in the amount of $200, that being the minimum reasonable cost of responding to this meritless motion.”). B. Even if plaintiff had a pending discovery request and had complied with the rules, she would be barred from access to Ms. Maxwell’s attorney-client communications. The attorney-client privilege “belongs solely to the client and may only be waived by him. An attorney may not waive the privilege without his client’s consent.” Jn re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1987); accord, e.g., In re Bank of New York Mellon Corp. Forex Transactions Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 406, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Plaintiff cites a bevy of cases from New York to Minnesota to Texas for the proposition that the attorney-client can be waived. That is not in question. What is in question is whether 7