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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 223 Filed 04/20/21 Page /7 of 23 set forth herein stem from the role of [Ms. Maxwell] in the sexual exploitation and abuse of multiple minor girls by Jeffrey Epstein.” Indictment § 1. The Indictment also contains two conspiracy counts that charge Ms. Maxwell with conspiring with Epstein. /d. 9] 9, 15. According to the government, however, Ms. Maxwell’s status as an alleged co- conspirator of Epstein is somehow insufficient for an NPA that immunizes “potential co- conspirators of Epstein” to apply to her. The government claims that there is “no evidence that the parties intended to confer a benefit on her in particular.” Opp. 20. In essence, the government implausibly argues that even though the parties expressly agreed to immunize “any potential co-conspirators of Epstein,” only those individuals whom the parties were thinking about “in particular” qualify for immunity. The government cites no support for the rule it has concocted, and case law is to the contrary. For example, in United States v. Florida West Int’l Airways, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2012), where a corporation had entered into a plea agreement that immunized its employees, the court held that one of those employees had standing to enforce the agreement as a third-party beneficiary by virtue of his employment; the court did not require a showing that the parties thought about protecting that employee “in particular” when they agreed to immunize the class. /d. at 1228. Similarly, in United States v. El-Sadig, 133 F. Supp. 2d 600 (N.D. Ohio 2001), where a Saudi prince had entered into an agreement with the government that none of the individuals involved in purchasing guns for two members of the Saudi royal family would be prosecuted, the court did not require the defendant to show that the government and the prince intended to immunize him “in particular”; to the contrary, as the court noted, the parties to the agreement did not even discuss the defendant. /d. at 604. DOJ-OGR-00003880