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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 223 Filed 04/20/21 Page 16 of 23 consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent.’ To the extent that the Court finds that extrinsic evidence is relevant, however, the government’s argument demonstrates precisely why the Court should permit discovery in this action. While the government ludicrously faults Ms. Maxwell for failing to produce “documentary evidence” of the parties’ intent and the scope of the SDFL investigation (Opp. 10), Ms. Maxwell, as a nonparty to the NPA, has no access to such evidence without discovery. Any evidence of the parties’ intent would be in the possession of the government and Epstein’s counsel, and at this stage, Ms. Maxwell can only scour the few clues available to the public—such as a privilege log filed in a related civil lawsuit—for crumbs of information about the negotiation and investigation. The government’s response to those crumbs illustrates why any consideration of extrinsic evidence—which, as noted above, is unnecessary given the unambiguous text of the NPA— should be preceded by discovery. In her opening memorandum, Ms. Maxwell cited to three pages from the above-referenced privilege log in a civil lawsuit filed by one of Epstein’s victims, all of which contain entries reflecting the USAO-SDFL’s consultation with the United States Attorney’s Office for this District, travel by USAO-SDFL attorneys to New York, or interviews and/or subpoenas of New York-based witnesses. Mem. at 11 (citing Privilege Log, Doe v. United States, Case No. 9:08-CV-80736 (S.D. Fla.), Dkt. No. 212-1 (filed July 19, 2013) (“SDFL Privilege Log”), at 4, 5, 7). In response, the government has focused on only one of those three entries and produced the documents referenced in the privilege log. See Opp. 10. ’ The government’s argument that a United States Attorney lacks the “authority” to bind other districts (Opp. 13- 14)—and that the government can simply walk away from a plea agreement in which a United States Attorney has not received the approvals prescribed by internal Justice Department guidelines—is unavailing. The government cites no case in which a court has invalidated a plea agreement on this basis, and its argument is contradicted not only by the Third, Fourth, and Eighth circuits—in which the default rule is that plea agreements bind other districts—but also by the Second Circuit’s statement that a United States Attorney may bind other districts in a plea agreement if there is an affirmative appearance to that effect. United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 547-49 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Van Thornout, 100 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 1986); Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672. 12 DOJ-OGR-00003889