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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 267 _ Filed 05/03/21 Page5of7 The Hon. Alison J. Nathan May 3, 2021 Page 5 assistance when it interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the defense.”’). If the court were to act outside its statutory authority and compel defense counsel to disclose defense material prematurely, then Ms. Maxwell’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights would be endangered. While the aims of judicial economy and efficiency may be served by ordering the defense to disclose prospective witnesses, such policy goals, however laudable, cannot trump fundamental liberties. “In the administration of criminal justice, courts must carefully guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.” Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503. II. Procedural Rules Aside, the Government Must Timely Disclose Any Brady and Giglio Material. Brady and its progeny impose upon the government broad duties of disclosure. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment”); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (defining materiality); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999) (same); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (government has duty to disclose material affecting reliability of government witnesses). The court’s authority, or lack thereof, to order disclosures under Rules 16 and 26.2 does not affect the defendant’s right to Brady material. “It is, of course, a fundamental axiom of American law, rooted in our history as a people and requiring no citations to authority, that the requirements of the Constitution prevail over a statute in the event of a conflict.” Coppa, 267 DOJ-OGR-00004088