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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 285 Filed 05/20/21 Page 25 of 34 IV. The Remedy for the Government’s Misconduct. A. Pursuant to its Inherent Power, this Court Should Suppress the Evidence Obtained from Boies Schiller and Dismiss Counts Five and Six, which are the Fruits of that Evidence. This Court has inherent authority to regulate the administration of criminal Justice among the parties. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). “Judges have an obligation to exercise supervision over the administration of criminal justice in federal courts, a responsibility that ‘implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence.’” United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 789 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting McNabb, 318 USS. at 340). As the Supreme Court held in United States v. Payner, “Federal courts may use their supervisory power in some circumstances to exclude evidence taken from the defendant by ‘willful disobedience of law.’” 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980) (quoting McNabb, 318 U.S. at 345) (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 216-17 (1956); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment)). A court should invoke its supervisory power of suppression when “there has been a fraud upon the court in addition to a violation of the defendant’s rights.” United States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d 1207, 1216 (7th Cir. 1980). In United States v. Cortina, a magistrate issued a search warrant based upon an affidavit subscribed by FBI Agent Linda Stewart, which itself was based on the reports and investigation of FBI Agent William Brown. /d. at 1208. Unbeknownst to Agent Stewart, Agent Brown’s Second Circuit in Brown v. Maxwell held a few months after Judge McMahon’s ruling that Maxwell had reasonably relied on the Protective Order’s guarantee of confidentiality in substantial part, and it therefore redacted sua sponte from the summary judgment material those “deposition responses concerning intimate matters where the questions were likely only permitted—and the responses only compelled— because of a strong expectation of continued confidentiality. 929 F.3d 4, 48, n.22 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2). So, too, has Judge Preska redacted substantial material from the documents she has released on remand from the Second Circuit, again reflecting that Maxwell reasonably relied on the Protective Order. 20 DOJ-OGR-00004160