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the substance of any real peace — could not simply be put off forever.
Untangling them was getting harder, not easier. And we realised that only in an
environment like Camp David — a “pressure cooker” was how I described it to
Clinton, and to US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright — would we ever
discover whether a peace deal could in fact be done.
Now, we knew.
Israel’s equivalent of Air Force One, perhaps in a nod to our country’s
pioneering early years, was an almost prehistoric Boeing 707. It was waiting on
the runway at Andrews Air Force Base outside Washington to ferry me and the
rest of our negotiating team back home.
It contained a low-rent equivalent of the American version’s presidential
cabin, and a few 1960s-vintage first-class seats, but consisted mostly of two
long lines of coach seats, three abreast, separated by an almost tightrope-narrow
aisle. I dare say I was alone in finding an odd sense of comfort in boarding the
plane. This museum piece of an aircraft was part of my past. It was the same
model of 707 for which I, with a couple of other young soldiers and engineers,
had come up with what we dubbed the “submarine door” system outside the
cockpit — to protect El Al pilots from future attacks after one of its planes had
been hijacked to Algiers in the summer of 1968. It was also the same kind of
plane — a Sabena flight, hijacked to Tel Aviv’s Ben-Gurion Airport — which I
stormed, before sunrise, four years later with a force of nearly two dozen
Matkal commandos. The shooting was over within 90 seconds. One of my men
—a junior officer named Bibi Netanyahu — was wounded. By one of our own
bullets. But we managed to kill two of the heavily armed hijackers, capture the
others, and free all 90 passengers unharmed.
Still, even I had to accept, it was no fun to fly on.
As we banked eastward after takeoff and headed out over the Atlantic, the
mood on board was sober. Huddling with the inner core of my negotiating team
— my policy co-ordinator Gilad Sher, security aide Danny Yatom and Foreign
Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami — I could see that the way the summit ended had hit
them hard. It was probably true, as all three often reminded me, that the greatest
pressure fell on me. I was the one who ultimately decided what we could, or
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