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party politics. But we talked at length about Israel’s immediate security concerns, as well as the country’s longer-term challenges in finding its place in more stable, peaceful Middle East. How, over time, we might manage to extricate ourselves from the escalating violence with Hizbollah; reach a land- for-peace deal with the enigmatic President Hafez al-Assad in Syria; and find some form of coexistence with the Palestinians. He also spoke about international politics. I remember one afternoon in the summer of 1992 when he mentioned the then US presidential candidate Bill Clinton. He’d met Clinton for the first time in Washington, after two days of talks with President Bush at his summer home in Maine. Rabin was naturally more comfortable dealing with Republicans. Almost all his experience in public life — as a military officer, ambassador to Washington, Defense Minister and Prime Minister — had coincided with Republican administrations. The irony was that he would go on to forge a much closer relationship with President Clinton than between any previous Israeli and US leader. But his first impression was more skeptical. “Clearly, Clinton is very intelligent,” he said. “He is surprisingly sharp politically for someone his age. But also, I fear, a little bit too slick.” We did not have long to focus on the lessons and implications of Tze’elim. For weeks before the training accident, a crisis had been building in south Lebanon, with a sharp escalation of the now-familiar mix of clashes inside our “security zone” and cross-border rocket attacks. Hizbollah was now armed not just with Katyushas but Saggers, American-made TOW anti-tank missiles and an increasingly sophisticated array of roadside bombs. A combination of Hizbollah attacks and “friendly fire” incidents or firearms accidents involving our troops meant that Israelis were still dying in Lebanon a decade after the formal end of the war. It was demoralizing for the Israeli public, for the soldiers who we rotated into the security zone and for the government as well. The difficulty was that it was also a situation that perfectly suited Hizbollah. In late October, a Katyusha rocket had claimed the life of a 14-year-old boy in the northern Israeli town of Kiryat Shmona. Hizbollah escalated its rocket fire in the days that followed, forcing tens of thousands of residents into their shelters. Predictably, there was pressure from Likud politicians to hit back hard. 250 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011721