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/ BARAK / 16 talks with the Americans on the further West Bank redeployments meandered ahead. We also discussed in detail how a unity government would work. We agreed it would be presented, like the Shamir-Peres partnership in 1984, as a cross- party response to an important challenge for the country: in this case, security and the peace process. I would be both Defense Minister and “Vice-Prime Minister’, with the understanding that Bibi and I would jointly discuss all major issues before jointly agreeing to bring them to the full cabinet. But in August, the talks ended, after news of our talks finally leaked. I immediately phoned Ne’eman. I reminded him that at the outset, I’d said that would mean the discussions were over. He did call me back later in the day to say Bibi insisted that he’d had nothing to do with the leak. My guess was that the source was my old comrade from the Chinese Farm, Yitzhik Mordechai, who had presumably heard that Bibi was ready to make me Defense Minister as part of a unity government. There was, of course, already a defense minister: Yitzhik. Bibi’s idea to reopen efforts to get peace with Syria didn’t last either. Although I'd learn of this only a few years later, he’d approved a visit to Damascus by the American Jewish businessman Ronald Lauder to meet President Assad. The visit made it clear to Bibi what successive Israeli leaders had learned: a deal might be possible, but only if Israel was willing to commit in advance to pulling out of the Golan. Assad told Lauder to come back to him with a detailed map setting out Bibi’s view on delineating the Israeli-Syrian border under a peace agreement. Though no one in the cabinet knew the initiative was underway, Bibi realized that before sending back the map Assad wanted, he would need to tell the two senior ministers directly affected: Arik Sharon, who had replaced David Levy as Foreign Minister; and Yitzhik Mordechai. Both of them said no, with Yitzhik pointing out that a signed map would inevitably become part of the negotiating record. It was a step that, in future negotiations, could not be undone. Bibi’s coalition was now creaking. The Syrian option was off. David Levy had already jumped ship. Yitzhik, increasingly concerned about Bibi’s delay and drift on Oslo II, seemed to be thinking of leaving as well. Right wing ministers and Knesset members were no happier: they opposed even the slightest prospect of movement on Oslo. In October, Bibi did finally try to seize the initiative. He wrapping up the redeployment details in a summit with Arafat and Clinton and Arafat in Wye River. But as soon as he got back home, he started backtracking, rather than risk facing down his right-wing critics in the cabinet. Implementation of 302 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011773