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/ BARAK / 39 president and his negotiating team had spent the previous few, frustrating years trying alternately to urge, nudge and cajole him — and, of course, Arafat — toward implementing Oslo. Clinton did finally succeed in getting the Wye River agreement. But it, too, remained to be implemented. Nava’s presence, and Hillary Clinton’s, contributed to an informal, familial atmosphere. Before my first round of talks with the President, we joined Bill and Hillary for dinner. Though I would work more closely with Hillary in later years, when she was Secretary of State under President Obama, this was the first time I’d had the opportunity to engage in anything more than small talk with her. She was less naturally outgoing than her husband. Yet not only was she bright and articulate. She was barely less informed on the ins and outs of Middle East peace negotiations than the President. She, and Bill as well, also spoke with us about things well beyond the diplomacy of the Middle East: science, music, and our shared interest in history. What most struck Nava and me, however, was the way the Clintons interacted with each other. The scandal surrounding Monica Lewinsky was still fresh. I suppose we expected to see signs of tension. Whether they were there, we had no way of knowing. But what the two of them did palpably have was a deep respect for each other’s intelligence, insight and creativity in looking for solutions where so many others saw only problems. It was impressive. Still, there was little small talk in the long discussions I had with the President. From the outset, I wanted him to know exactly what I hoped we could accomplish and how, in my view, we were most likely to get there. I wasn’t trying to impose “sround rules” on the President of the United States, something I neither would nor could do. But I was explicit with him about my own approach the negotiations. I assured him I was prepared to be flexible. But I said I’d be relying on two critical assumptions. The first was that when we and the Americans agreed a position on a specific issue, there would be no unilateral “surprises” — by which I meant, though didn’t say, things like the unfortunate American redefinition of Yitzhak’s “pocket deposit” assurance regarding the Golan. The second assumption, I know, may seem overly legalistic. It was that, until and unless we reached a full and final agreement with either Syria or the Palestinians, any Israeli negotiating ideas or proposals would not be binding. If no agreement was reached, they would become null and void. I wanted to avoid a situation, as had happened so often in past negotiations, where an Israeli proposal was rejected by the Arab side but then treated as the opening position in the expectation of further concessions in later 325 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011796