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/ BARAK / 58 previous Israeli leader in trying to get that peace. I knew that he would press me to tell him how far that actually was. He didn’t ask directly. But each of his ostensibly theoretical questions was aimed at establishing whether I could give him enough for a summit to bridge the gaps on key issues. Could I accept a “trade-off between sovereignty and time?” Translation: could I give the Palestinians sovereignty over a larger part of the West Bank if we signed an agreement that would phase in their control? Could I accept the principle of land swaps? This meant giving Arafat land in areas bordering the West Bank, or in the Negev near Gaza, to compensate, at least partially, for the area we would keep for the major settlement blocs. What about applying my principle of “disengagement” between Israel and the Palestinians to Jerusalem? Meaning Arafat getting control of the predominantly Arab neighborhoods in the east of the city. Dennis knew my long-standing reluctance to commit to concessions until we got to real, final negotiations with Arafat. “We’ll not reveal anything you tell us,” he assured me. “We won’t turn what you say into opening negotiating positions for Arafat. But if there is going to be a summit, the President wanted some answers.” To Dennis’s frustration, however, I could give him no specifics, beyond telling him: “You know me, Dennis. You know I’m serious about this. Of course, we will protect our vital security and national interests. But the problem in making peace won't be us, on the Israeli side, as long as Arafat shows a capacity and a will for decision.” The translation of that, as I hoped and trusted he understood was that if and when Arafat demonstrated that he wanted a comprehensive peace between a new Palestinian state and the State of Israel — a definitive “end of conflict” as the international lawyers would describe it — I would place nothing, except our security and core national interests, in the way of getting an agreement. Madeleine Albright visited at the end of June. When she came to see me a day after meeting Arafat, she carried a request from the Palestinian leader: two weeks of “preparatory” talks before a summit. Again, I knew her mission was to bring back enough progress for the President to feel a summit was worth it. But again, I couldn’t give her what she wanted. “I know what will happen in preparatory talks,” I said. “We'll raise new ideas, which the Palestinians will reject, and ask for more.” I don’t know what she told Clinton, or Arafat. But Dennis called me the following day. He said that Arafat had agreed to attend a summit, and would leave the date up to the President. 344 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011815