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/ BARAK / 67 simply to withdraw the paper. Clinton’s answer encouraged, and surprised, me. “We agree,” he said. “The paper no longer exists.” It soon turned out the Palestinians were unhappy with it too, but for another reason. On the lookout for validation of Arafat’s insistence that Camp David was an Israeli “trap”, they were convinced that the paper had Israel’s fingerprints all over it. That wasn’t true. The one change we’d insisted on was because it misrepresented our position on Jerusalem. Still, since Dennis had added the word “expanded” to the Jerusalem section in longhand, the Palestinians were convinced of Israel co-authorship. In fact, three days into the summit, the mood among the Palestinians seemed increasingly aggrieved. Not just the Americans, but some members of my own team, were urging me to show more “personal warmth” towards Arafat. I did always exchange greetings and pleasantries with him at mealtimes in Laurel Lodge, but even there, I admit, that I didn’t exactly show enthusiasm, much less ebullience. After one dinner, when I’d been placed between the Palestinian leader and Chelsea Clinton, the President’s National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger, asked me why, rather than talking to Arafat, I’d spent almost the entire time chatting with Chelsea. My response was only half-joking: “Given the choice, who wouldn’t?” It wasn’t only that I believed a charm initiative would come over as contrived. I didn’t want to risk misleading Arafat, the other Palestinians and possibly the Americans as well, by giving them the impression I was satisfied with the progress of the summit, or felt that we were heading towards any serious engagement and compromise on the core issues. I had met Arafat many times before Camp David. I had made it clear in all of those meeting that, despite differences on a range of difficult issues, I did want a final peace agreement and that I was ready to consider the tough decisions necessary to make it possible. At Camp David, I was not against meeting Arafat as a matter of principle. I simply felt the time for such a meeting, if it came, would be at the moment that we saw at least some signal of a readiness on his part to negotiate seriously. Still, given the strength of feeling among some of my own negotiators, I felt a responsibility to give it a try. I told Yossi Ginossar, the former Shin Bet officer who was closest to the Palestinian leader among the Israelis, to set up an informal meeting. I added, to Yossi’s obvious satisfaction and surprise, that I’d be willing to have the meeting in Arafat’s cabin if that’s what he preferred. The next afternoon, I went there for tea and baklava. Abu Mazen, his top political adviser and the main 353 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011824