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deal with a major conflict with the Syrians. All of this, under a tight seal of
secrecy.
Finally, in early September 2007, everything was in place. Olmert briefed the
cabinet, and secured the ministers’ approval to destroy the reactor, with the
understanding that the precise timing of the operation would now be left to the
Prime Minister, the Defense Minister and the Foreign Minister: Olmert, me and
Tzipi Livni. The three of us met immediately after the cabinet discussion. Olmert
argued that the risk of leaks justified attacking that night, and I agreed with him.
Tzipi was reluctant, but Olmert turned to her and said: “Are you sure you’re
comfortable with an attack being ordered by me and Barak, while you chose to
abstain?” She thought it over, and added her approval.
We struck just after midnight, in an intricately coordinated air attack that
evaded not only a Syrian response, but Syrian notice. The reactor was destroyed.
Although even today the exact details remain subject to Israel’s military secrecy
regulations, accounts published abroad in the weeks and months that followed
painted a surprisingly accurate picture, including the pioneering use of electronic
warfare capabilities to deal with risk of radar detection. But in the immediate
aftermath of the attack, Israel deliberately made no public comment. We refused to
say whether we’d had anything to do with an attack. As we he had hoped, this
allowed the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, both the space and a good reason to
deny that it had ever happened, deny that he’d been trying to make a nuclear
weapon, and thus feel no compelling reason to retaliate.
The reactor operation, however, marked the start of an increasingly tough
period in both my and Tzipi’s relationship with Olmert. Policy was not the
problem. There were no major security crises in the months ahead. But in the
spring of 2008, it became known that the Israeli police were investigating Olmert’s
relationship with an American businessman named Moshe Talansky. The
suggestion, initially in a New York paper and then the Israeli press, was that
Olmert was guilty of taking bribes. In his first public response, he didn’t deny
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