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/ BARAK / 137 remembering that, in spite of Israel’s insistence from 1948 onward that we would never ask others to do our fighting for us, even as Leon and I were meeting, US radar operators were working around the clock to provide us with early warning against any incoming Iranian missiles. Patriot batteries were ready to deploy in Israel within 72 hours of any attack. AEGIS naval vessels were within 96 hours of our shores, to reinforce Israel’s Arrow missile defense system with sea-launched weapons. Panetta made no secret of the fact he didn’t want us to launch a military strike, effectively killing off the many months of intenstve work the Americans had devoted to building international political and economic pressure on the Iranians. He urged me to “think twice, three times,” before going down that road. But he recognized that Israel would be affected far more dramatically by a nuclear Iran. “It’s your conflict. It’s your neighborhood,” he said. At one point, he asked me outright: “If you do decide to attack the Iranian facilities, when will we know?” I told him we couldn’t give him more than a few hours’ notice. Otherwise, the Americans would have to alert their bases in the Gulf, and worldwide. That might well put Iran on guard before our operation was launched. But I did recognize our responsibility not to leave the Americans in the dark, not only because they were a key ally but because their own military and naval personnel might be at risk from any Iranian retaliation. “We know your command-post deployment and the communications protocols with your forces,” I told him. “We’II make sure you have enough time to tell your people,” I said. “We won’t endanger a single American life, any of your positions or your personnel.” My most important meeting was with the President. Though I knew him less well than I did Panetta, we had met on a number of occasions. The first time was when he was still Senator Obama, on a visit to Israel during the 2008 presidential campaign. As Defense Minister, I escorted him to Sderot, the town in southern Israel bearing the brunt of Hamas rocket attacks from Gaza. Back in Jerusalem, we spent a half-hour talking in my office: about Iran. I argued that a nuclear Iran was a challenge not only for Israel and the Middle East, but for America, too. I urged him, if elected, to commission an early study of what the Iranians were seeking to do and what could be done to stop them either by diplomatic means or, if necessary, by force. Also, what the Iranians could, or more relevantly could not, do in response to an American or indeed an Israel attack, since our intelligence assessments suggested their options for retaliation would be fairly limited. Obama 423 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011894