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By early 2011, China had to cool the economy and tackle the
rising leverage and speculation. Policymakers also declared a
shift in China’s growth model to be more consumption-driven.
The transition probably turned out to be more complicated
than Chinese policymakers may have expected. Unlike the
infrastructure-driven growth model under which the pace of
growth could be controlled by adjusting the pipeline of
construction projects, a consumption-driven model would let
the “invisible hand” of self-interested consumers exert more
influence. In other words, a consumption-driven model would
cede more control to market forces and experience more
unpredictability. While variability in realized growth versus
projection is a fact of life in the rest of the world, Chinese
officials have sought to minimize this uncertainty as the failure
to hit growth targets could affect confidence.
With an estimated homeownership rate around 90% and many
families holding multiple apartments as investments, China’s
housing market has an outsized impact on wealth, consumption
and construction, as well as the general economy. As shown in
CHART 1, the rapid housing price increases in 2010 and 2011
prompted regulators to cool the housing market, which resulted
in price declines in 2012. However, the slowing economy soon
pushed them to relax home purchase restrictions. Predictably,
housing prices rebounded as a response, with double-digit
increases in tier-one cities, prompting measures to tame the
bubble once again by 2014.
It is quite clear that there isa momentum-driven herd mentality
among Chinese buyers, as expressed in the Chinese adage “buy
up market, not down” (tk # F HK).
In an attempt to wean investors off real estate and channel their
capital to highly leveraged state-owned companies,
policymakers engineered a stock market rally in the second half
of 2014. As the rally gained momentum, the herd flocked in
(buy up market, not down) and pumped up a huge stock bubble
that eventually blew up by mid-2015. This was followed by the
renminbi’s official devaluation in August 2015 to alleviate the
pressure from the surging U.S. dollar.
Confronted with slowing economic growth, declining foreign
exchange reserves, rising capital flight, and a collapsing stock
market, Chinese policymakers shelved the reform agenda and
went back to the proven playbook—infrastructure and real
estate buildout. China even eased property investment rules for
foreign institutions and individuals. The result was perhaps the
biggest housing bubble ever in China’s tier-one cities—prices
surged over 30% year-over-year by the spring of 2016. It is as if
China was validating the old physiocratic economic theory
which postulated that the wealth of a nation lies in its land
development.
For years China has justified its rapid property price increases
on the basis that it is just catching up to global metropolises
such as London, New York, Hong Kong, Tokyo, etc. The latest
price surge has indeed accomplished that and more. For
example, a run-of-the-mill two-bedroom apartment in Beijing’s
financial district now costs more than $2,000 per square foot.
Skyrocketing domestic property prices have also distorted
many Chinese investors’ views of foreign properties—they are
bargains relative to prices in Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen.
It is no wonder Chinese investors have bid up property prices
in many major cities around the globe. As a sign of the times,
Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices has
recently teamed up with China’s Juwai.com to bring American
residential property listings to China.
An Under-Appreciated Reflation Story
According to a U.S. State Department memo released by
WikiLeaks, when Chinese premier Li Keqiang was serving as
the party secretary of Liaoning Province in 2007, he supposedly
told a U.S. ambassador that he did not have confidence in the
provincial GDP data. He preferred to monitor three indicators
to assess the state of the local economy: the rail freight volume,
electricity consumption and bank loan volume. In 2010, The
Economist introduced the Li Keqiang Index, which takes the
weighted average of these three metrics’ annual growth rates to
track Chinese economic growth.
The Li Keqiang Index has indeed tracked the direction of
China’s reported GDP data as shown in CHART 2. There was a
clear growth deceleration in 2015 and a strong rebound in 2016.
CHART 1: YEAR-OVER-YEAR CHANGE IN CHINA NEW PROPERTY PRICES
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
-5%
-10%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Ml China 70 Cities New Apartment Prices
Mumm China First Tier Cities New Apartment Prices
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source: Bloomberg
GLOBAL FORESIGHT THIRPD QUARTER 2017
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