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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 293-1 Filed 05/25/21 Page 88 of 349 She believed that access to the computer evidence would strengthen the government’s negotiating position, but that her supervisors “did not seem to recognize that.” Villafafia said she did not understand why her supervisors were uninterested in determining what the computers contained. Instead, they instructed Villafafia to “keep calling the judge” to ask for a delay in the litigation proceedings. Sloman told OPR that he recalled an issue about the computers, but did not recall “what the thinking was at the time” about pursuing that evidence or why Villafafia was “ordered to stand down.” Acosta, Menchel, and Lourie all told OPR that they did not recall Villafafia’s effort to obtain the computer evidence or that there had been litigation relating to it. Lourie, however, told OPR that the computers might have contained “very powerful evidence” that possibly “could have changed our advice to [Acosta], or his decision making.” In his OPR interview, Menchel was uncertain whether the computer evidence would have been useful, but also acknowledged to OPR, “You always want more as a prosecutor.” On August 31, 2007, in preparation for the upcoming September 7, 2007 meeting with defense counsel that he planned to attend, CEOS Chief Oosterbaan traveled to West Palm Beach to meet with Villafafia and the case agents and to examine the case file. He explained to OPR that he wanted to see the file before meeting with the defense so that he could best “represent[] the interests of the prosecution team,” and that he was in favor of going forward with the case. According to Villafafia, during his review of the file, Oosterbaan told her that the case was “really good” and offered to assist Villafafia at trial. On September 6, 2007, the day before the meeting with defense counsel, Sloman sent Villafafia an email asking, “Please refresh my recollection. What is the ‘deal’ on the table?” Sloman told OPR that his question reflected the fact that in his capacity as FAUSA, he was involved in “a hundred other things” at that time.?® Villafafia sent Sloman the term sheet and explained to him, “You and Matt [Menchel] and I had also discussed a possible federal plea to an Information charging a 371 conspiracy, with a Rule 11 plea with a two-year cap, but I think Matt must have asked Alex about it and it was nixed.” Villafafia continued: There are three concerns that I hope we can address tomorrow. First, that there is an absolute drop-dead date for accepting or rejecting because it is strategically important that we indict before the end of September, which means . . . September 25th. Second, the agents and I have not reached out to the victims to get their approval, which as Drew [Oosterbaan] politely reminded me, is required under the law. And third, I do not want to make any promises about allowing Epstein to self-surrender because I still believe that we have a good chance of getting him detained.” %8 Sloman noted that with the attention given to the Epstein investigation, “it seems like . . . this was the only case [in the office], but there were other cases.” %° As Villafafia explained in her OPR interview, when a violent crime defendant self-surrenders, the government may have difficulty winning an argument for pretrial detention or bond. Contrary to Villafafia’s assertion in the email, the CVRA, even when applicable, required only victim consultation, not victim approval, and as is explained in 61 DOJ-OGR-00004385