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Extracted Text (OCR)
Exhibit 17: Labor Productivity Growth for
Different Groups of Firms
Rapid productivity growth of firms at the frontier of
innovation is not spreading to the rest of the industry.
ndex, 2001=1 (Log Points)
Frontier Firms—Top 5% in Each Industry/Year
Frontier Firms—Top 100 in Each Industry/ Year
a aie Non-Frontier Firms
0.9
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Data through 2013.
Note: Average across 24 OECD countries and 22 manufacturing and 27 market services
industries.
Source: Investment Strategy Group, OECD preliminary results based on Dan Andrews, Chiara
Criscuolo and Peter N. Gal, “Mind the Gap: Productivity Divergence Between the Global Frontier
and Laggard Firms,” OECD Productivity Working Papers, forthcoming.
Exhibit 18: US Financial Conditions Index
Conditions tightened significantly due to global shocks
emanating from the Eurozone, oil prices and China.
US Financial Conditions Index
101.5
101.0 +
fi
100.5 ~
+142bp
100.0 +
a5 4
99.0 +
98.5 4
98.0 ~
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Data through year-end 2016.
Source: Investment Strategy Group, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
the rest of the industry. Baily and Montalbano
suggest that increased regulation after the crisis
may be partially responsible for the widening gap
between frontier firms and the rest of the industry,
which lowers overall productivity growth rates
across the economy and hence lowers the pace of
economic growth.
Our colleagues in GIR think that lower capital
investment accounts for the lack of diffusion of
new technologies from more productive firms to
less productive firms.** Here, again, it is likely that
a more favorable business environment could have
boosted capital expenditures and increased overall
productivity levels.
We conclude that it is reasonable to assign
some of the weakness in this recovery to less
effective fiscal and regulatory policies out of
Washington rather than to structural shortcomings
in the US economy.
A Steady Onslaught of External Shocks
A sixth theory posits that numerous external
shocks explain the slow pace of this recovery.
Just as the US economy was recovering from the
trough of 2009, the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis
jolted global financial markets. The Eurozone
was a source of uncertainty and financial market
volatility beyond the initial shock in 2010 as the
crisis spread from Greece to Spain and Italy.
The Eurozone crisis was followed by a series
of what the Brookings Institution has called the
“fiscal fights of the Obama administration.” The
first fiscal fight resulted in the Standard and Poor’s
(S&P) downgrade of US Treasury debt in August
2011. The equity markets, as measured by the S&P
500 Index, dropped about 19% between April and
October of 2011.
Taken together, the Eurozone sovereign debt
crisis and the first of the fiscal fights tightened
US financial conditions*®® by 142 basis points (see
Exhibit 18). GIR estimates that a 100 basis point
tightening of financial conditions is equivalent to a
federal funds hike of 150 basis points and a drag
on GDP growth of about one percentage point.
The drop in oil prices from a post-crisis high
of $107 per barrel for West Texas Intermediate
in June 2014 to a trough of $26 per barrel in
February 2016 also provided a shock to the
economy. Employment and capital expenditures
in the oil and gas sector dropped by 29% and
67%, respectively, from peak levels seen in 2014.
The sector’s par-weighted default rate excluding
distressed exchanges reached 14.6% and including
such exchanges 19.8%, in October 2016.°?
Broad-based fear of policy mistakes in China
and unexpected depreciation of the renminbi were
Outlook | Investment Strategy Group 19
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