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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 293-1 Filed 05/25/21 Page 298 of 349 investigation. Because the state indictment and information appeared to pertain to far fewer than the total victims identified in either the state or the federal investigation, and no one at the USAO was certain which victims were covered by the state charges, it should have been apparent to Acosta that without advance planning between the USAO and the State Attorney’s Office, there was a substantial risk that most of the victims identified in the federal investigation would not receive notice of the hearing.*”° Notification to the broadest possible number of identified victims could only have been successful if there was appropriate communication between the USAO and the state prosecutors, communication that had previously been lacking regarding other significant issues relating to Epstein. Villafafia and Sloman’s hastily arranged effort to enlist in the notification process PBPD Chief Reiter, who likely played little role in complying with the state’s victim notification obligations in a typical case, was not an adequate substitute for careful planning and coordination with the State Attorney’s Office.*”° Even if the State Attorney’s Office had notified all of the identified victims of the upcoming plea hearing, there was no guarantee that such notification would have included information that the state plea was resolving not just the state’s investigation of Epstein, but the federal investigation as well. The State Attorney was not obligated by state statutes to inform the victims of the status of the federal investigation, and there was little reason to assume Krischer, or one of his staff, would voluntarily do so, thereby putting the State Attorney’s Office in the position of fielding victim questions and concerns about the outcome. Furthermore, as both the USAO and the defense had differing views as to who could lawfully participate in the state plea hearing, there is no indication that Acosta, Sloman, or Villafafia took steps to confirm that, if victims appeared, they could actually participate in the state court proceeding when they were not victims of the charged crimes. #7 Through counsel, Acosta asserted to OPR that because Villafafia and Sloman both told OPR that they believed that state officials would notify the victims, “OPR identified no reason why Secretary Acosta should have distrusted his team on these points.” Acosta’s counsel further 425 Krischer told OPR that the state’s notification obligation extended to all victims identified in the state investigation. Nonetheless, which victims were encompassed in the state’s investigation was unclear. The PBPD’s probable cause affidavit included crimes against only 5 victims, not the 19 identified in the state investigation. According to state records made public, the state subpoenaed to the grand jury only 3 victims. After Epstein’s guilty plea, the state sent notification letters to only 2 victims. Belohlavek told OPR that because of the nature of the charges, she did not know whether “technically under the law” the girls were “victims” she was required to notify of the plea hearing. 46 The State Attorney’s Office had its own procedures and employees who handled victim notification, and Belohlavek told OPR that the Chief of the Police Department would not regularly play a role in the state victim notification process. 427 Although Villafafia’s notes indicate that she researched Florida Statutes §§ 960.001 and 921.143 when she drafted unsent letters to victims in November and December 2007 inviting them to participate in the state plea hearing pursuant to those statues, the caselaw was not clear that all federal victims would have been allowed to participate in the state plea hearing. In Lefkowitz’s November 29, 2007 letter to Acosta, he argued that the statutes afforded a right to speak at a defendant’s sentencing or to submit a statement only to the victims of the crime for which the defendant was being sentenced. In April 2008, a Florida District Court of Appeal ruled against a defendant who argued that Florida Statute § 921.143(1) did not allow the testimony of the victim’s relatives at the sentencing hearing. The court ruled that § 921.143 (1) “should not be read as limiting the testimony Rule 3.720(b) allows trial courts to consider at sentencing hearings.” Smith v. State, 982 So. 2d 69, 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 271 DOJ-OGR-00004595