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Toward Economic Recovery in Dubai
November 18, 2009
Andrew Butter
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On the sidelines of the big news there are two stories
making the rounds: Dubai property and Dubai debt.
In the grand scheme of things, Dubai is a pretty small place
(the economy is about 45% the size of Singapore's), but it's
interesting from the perspective of bubbles.
Now that the initial chaos of the bubble bursting has worn
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off, it's possible (perhaps) to plot what might happen next.
Property Prices:
Depending on who you talk to, "freehold" property prices
either halved or went down 70% between October 2008 and
March 2009.("Freehold" is property that foreigners can buy,
which currently accounts for about 30% of the stock in
Dubai). Here's a chart of who lived where in Dubai
2008: (Click to enlarge)
The
point is that there are three markets, all going in different
directions.
The main reason for the bubble was that 90% of the
"foreigners" market is focused on rentals, and less than 20%
of the residual are "high flyers" with a second home. In
2005, there was a huge demand for new accommodation
because of economic growth, plus the start of the freehold
construction boom; that had to be accommodated by new
units, and the rents of those went through the roof.
Existing accommodation lagged, so you could find one
apartment in a building renting for $25,000 (since it had
been rented a few years before and there was implicit and
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later explicit rent control for incumbents), and a newly
vacated one next door being rented for $75,000, and being
snapped up.
So the buyers only saw the rents on the (new) stuff on offer,
and they thought, "OK, I'll buy at a 7% gross yield or so, and
that's not counting for the "fact" that in Dubai house prices
will go on going up forever." Whoopee!
But that price wasn't a true reflection of market reality, and
as soon as new units started coming on line (plus the
economic slowdown), reality was restored. Yields didn't
change, but rents went down.
The rate of development of "new" accommodation is on the
right on the chart above. The current situation is that
construction almost stopped (buildings under construction
typically got finished, but a lot got cancelled although it's not
clear how many did).
The consensus projection in 2008 was for 70,000 new units
in 2010 (that's not hard, you just need to be able to count
that far), some are projecting that figure will go down to
20,000.
How fast prices recover is an issue that depends mainly on
the recovery of the Dubai economy, and that may depend on
the second story in the newspapers.
Debt:
The second big story is that Dubai Inc. (i.e. the Government
of Dubai plus "government-related issuers" (GSI)) owes
between $80 billion and $160 billion of relatively short-term
debt; depending on what newspaper stories you believe.
There are reports that they are having some complications
rolling that debt over, thanks in part to the worldwide credit
crunch (they got caught borrowing short and investing long).
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Earlier in the year there were concerns that there would be
defaults, although there was never any question that Dubai's
"rich relations" in Abu Dhabi would make sure that the
essential infrastructure of Dubai kept working.
There have been no defaults so far and Dubai has a long
tradition of paying its debts, most of the development over
the past thirty years was paid for with debt.
Of course, there's always a first time.
Some of the debt was recently downgraded from A3 to Baal
by Moody's, this is what they said:
"Following recent disclosures of increased conditionality
around when support could be provided to the GRIs"
In other words, a divide is building between debt that has
some semblance of a sovereign guarantee, i.e. implicitly or
explicitly guaranteed by the UAE Federal Government via
the Dubai Financial Support Fund, and debt that has either a
personal guarantee or that is collateralized by assets.
How much of the debt is in the "good debt" camp, and how
much is in the "not so good" camp is not clear, although
reports suggest thatperhaps the biggest debtor is the "state-
owned" conglomerate Dubai World (which owns the
developer Nakheel and Dubai Ports Authority (and which
recently bought P&O Ports)), according to reports Dubai
World owes between $40 billion and $60 billion.
The idea of "state-owned" is also an interesting concept; the
latest twist that was noticed by Moody's seems to imply that
that the "state" owns the assets, but not the liabilities.
What's also uncertain is how much of that was squandered
buying assets outside of Dubai at the top of the market,
possibly "double geared."
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Starting in 2006, "Dubai Inc." went on a high profile shopping
spree, investing in projects such as the MGM development
in Las Vegas, which was a bit of a departure from the tried
and tested business model of investing every penny in
Dubai itself.
That "old idea" was the motto of Sheikh Rashid who is once
reported to have remarked, "I will build the infrastructure (in
Dubai); the rest will follow." It was a good idea, and "the
rest" followed.
$1.3 trillion backstop?
Some estimates put the collateral backing up the $80 billion
to $160 billion of debt, at $1.3 trillion, although there are no
details on how that was calculated.
From the National Newspaper:
It's mere speculation at this point, but according to SJS
Markets, a Swiss brokerage, the new law could even cause
Dubai's government-owned companies to sell assets in
order to pay down debt and reduce its overall borrowings.
The new law if enacted could limit Dubai's debt financed
growth as the second largest emirate in the UAE has debt
load of -$70 bn while its GDP is -$55 bn. However Dubai's
assets are estimated at $1.3 trillion and we feel the
government could sell assets to pay down debt.
It's hard to figure out where that number came from seeing
as the total amount of GDP declared for the whole of Dubai
added up over the past twenty years was under $500 billion.
In a rare report on Dubai and Dubai Inc's finances done in
2003 by the National Bank of Dubai, the assets were rather
more modest. Of course, perhaps most of that $1.3 trillion
was made over the past five years?
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Oh well, perhaps the people in the know have a different
way to do valuations than the "old fashioned" methods, that
might explain why I read in the newspaper that RBS is in
town "helping out", they of course know all about doing
valuations.
Where Next?
Dubai is either an economic anomaly or a free-marketer's
fantasy land, depending on your perspective.
Twenty years ago the economy was 15% the size of
Singapore; in 2008 it was 45% ($US 80 billion). And
Singapore is no slouch when it comes to economic growth.
Dubai's nominal GDP growth averaged 15% since 1988,
and that growth was not driven (directly) by oil.
Why or how, or how much of that was inflation, are
questions economists can argue about, but the question of
inflation is rather academic considering that 90% of the labor
force are foreigners on temporary work visas.
In any case it's hard to explain that growth away by inflation
since the currency is tied to the dollar and freely exchanged;
and there are effectively no constraints on imports, of
anything, including brains and brawn; Dubai can shop the
world for the best deals on both of those commodities.
Details aside, the business model hardly changed since the
then Ruler((s)) of Dubai signed the Perpetual Maritime
Treaty in 1835 and declared Dubai a "Free Port" in 1901
making Dubai one of the first Special Economic Zones
(SEZ); although arguably the Square Mile City of London
and Venice preceded Dubai in that regard.
That's a formula that China adopted so successfully when it
embraced the "dangerous" path to capitalism, although it
kept those ideas well segregated from the "mother-land";
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currently 80% of China's exports are manufactured in such
zones; often in factories owned by foreigners.
Regardless, the SEZ idea clearly works and the fact that
Dubai (which hardly has any oil (left) to speak of), is located
where it is, is not the secret to its success, that's just
geography — what's fairly unique is the business model; and
the main difference from the China model is that in China
the labor is from the mainland, whereas in Dubai the labor is
from foreign countries. (And laborers are treated much
better in Dubai; don't believe what you read in the
newspapers).
Whatever happens, the core business model of Dubai is
driven mainly by foreigners providing local and international
goods and services, and it's likely that will carry on.
That's what made Dubai work in the first place; and without
that Dubai will have not very much but a load of empty real
estate; Dubai came to be what it is by being an open place
and safe place with good infrastructure and transportation,
to do business; that's where the money and the demand for
real estate comes from.
So regardless of what happens to the debt that is not
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the sovereign state of
Dubai, or whatever steps the bond-holders take to liquidate
whatever assets they collateralized that debt with, (in the
event that it defaults); it's likely that the essential and very
efficient infrastructure of Dubai will keep running, and will be
kept running.
In which case there will still be demand for real estate.
Property Prices:
This is the "BubbleOmics" estimate of what happened and a
projection of what's probably in
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store:
N
gy
way of explanation:
1: In 2004 freehold property was sold too cheap, that helped
fuel the bubble because people saw a disproportionate rise
in prices — the "pebble."
2: From 2006 to 2007 prices were at about the equilibrium.
3: Then there was a bubble; it was short; (18 to 24 months),
but intense, 40% mispricing about by my reckoning.
4: Then a bust, accompanied by a drop in nominal GDP and
an increase in inventory (that's why the equilibrium line goes
down).
5: Then the "overshoot" drop below the equilibrium which
was right on target (28% 1-1/1.4))
6: The exposed debt is now out of the market, anyone who
had to run away, has (that's what all the cars at the airport
were); likely therefore the time for "overshoot" will be about
the same time-span as the previous mis-pricing; that's what
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normally happens.
7: So by that logic, perhaps a 40% bounce from the lows
until the equilibrium is regained in 18 to 24 months from
now, i.e. perhaps about another 30% from here.
8: The path of the equilibrium line assumes oil (the main
driver of the Dubai economy, which has no oil but services a
region that has), will stay above $70.
One other factor that might hasten a recovery is the carry
trade in US dollars since the UAE currency is (and likely will
be for some time), denominated in US dollars, and it's fully
convertible.
Perhaps there will be another bubble in Dubai...thanks to the
US Fed?
Disclosure: No positions
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| Filename | EFTA02435824.pdf |
| File Size | 1479.7 KB |
| OCR Confidence | 85.0% |
| Has Readable Text | Yes |
| Text Length | 12,985 characters |
| Indexed | 2026-02-12T16:58:53.372570 |