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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 295 Filed 05/25/21 Page 15 of 26 failure to honor a plea agreement.” United States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 1982).4 There, as here, any barrier to prosecution of the defendant arose from the agreement with the prosecution, not the Double Jeopardy Clause. And, as described above, the NPA presents no barrier. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts Five and Six should be denied. Il. Counts Five and Six Are Timely Counts Five and Six are timely charged because the applicable limitations period, 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (2003), permits prosecution for offenses “involving the sexual or physical abuse. . . of a child” at any time “during the life of the child,” and the victim identified in Counts Five and Six of the S2 Indictment remains alive. The crimes alleged in Counts Five and Six plainly involved the sexual abuse of minors, meaning the § 3283 limitations period applies to both charges. See S2 Indictment 4 9(d) (discussing the sexual abuse of Minor Victim-4). In her motion, the defendant argues that § 3283 only applies if the elements of the crime of sex trafficking “necessarily entail” the sexual abuse of minors. (Def. Mot. at 20-21). In other words, the defendant claims that the “categorical approach” or “essential ingredients” test applies here. The Court has already considered and rejected this argument. (Apr. Op. at 9-13). As this Court has held, “[t]o the extent that the categorical approach is ever appropriate in other contexts, it is inappropriate here.” (Apr. Op. at 11). Instead, with respect to the statute of limitations, the * Although the opinions do not say whether the prosecuting office that signed the plea agreement was the same office that later prosecuted the Losadas, the prosecution also does not appear to have resisted the plea agreement on that basis. See Cambindo-Valencia, 609 F.2d at 638. > In her previous motions, the defendant argued that Counts One through Four were untimely, claiming that § 3283 cannot be applied retroactively. The Court rejected this argument. (Apr. Op. at 13-16 (analyzing the applicability of § 3283 to pre-2003 conduct under Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994))). In her current motion, the defendant does not appear to assert retroactivity arguments with respect to Counts Five and Six. Nor could she. Because Counts Five and Six involve conduct up to and including 2004, application of the 2003 amendment to § 3283 does not require the Court to engage in a retroactivity analysis. 11 DOJ-OGR-00004722