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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 295 _ Filed 05/25/21 Page 20 of 26 practice.”); United States v. Drago, No. 18 Cr. 0394 (SJF) (AYS), 2019 WL 3072288, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2019) (denying motion to dismiss on the ground of pre-indictment delay without prejudice to renewal). Because the defendant cannot meet her “heavy burden” of establishing either element of unconstitutional delay, let alone both, her motion to dismiss the $2 Indictment for pre-indictment delay is meritless and should be denied. Vv. The Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count Five and Either Count One or Count Three as Multiplicitous Is Premature The defendant moves to dismiss Counts One, Three, or Five on the ground that they are multiplicitous. Consistent with this Court’s prior ruling on a nearly identical issue, this motion should be denied as premature. (See Apr. Op. at 27-28). Each of these three counts charges the defendant with conspiring to commit distinct and separate crimes. In particular, Count One alleges that the defendant agreed to entice minors to travel, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422, Count Three alleges that she agreed to transport minors, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), and Count Five alleges that she agreed to engage in the sex trafficking of minors, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591. See S2 Indictment 9 11-13, 17-19, 23-25. Given the different objects of each conspiracy count, a jury could possibly find that the defendant committed some but not all of these charged offenses, and the Court will be best positioned to complete any multiplicity analysis after a full factual record is developed at trial. Accordingly, and consistent with the Second Circuit’s prior finding that district courts should defer ruling on a multiplicity challenge until after trial, this motion should be denied as premature. United States v. Josephberg, 459 F.3d 350, 355 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 16 DOJ-OGR-00004727