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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document307 Filed 06/25/21 Page12 of 21 Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 446 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). The Court agrees that, at the very least, the exception to the exclusionary rule for inevitable discovery applies to the documents that have since been unsealed and made public in the civil case. But because the Court finds no violation of the Fourth Amendment, it concludes that none of the documents should be suppressed. C. Maxwell is not entitled to suppression under due process or the Court’s inherent authority Maxwell next argues that the materials must be suppressed because the Government violated her due process rights in obtaining them. The gravamen of this claim is that the Government misrepresented its prior contacts with BSF to Judge McMahon. Maxwell contends that this misrepresentation violated her due process rights, or alternatively that the Court should exercise its inherent authority to suppress the evidence obtained through the subpoena as a sanction for governmental misconduct. She contends that even an inadvertent misstatement to a court requires suppression of evidence obtained as a result. She further seeks an evidentiary hearing to explore whether any misrepresentation by the Government in that hearing was intentional. The Supreme Court has recognized that federal courts have a limited inherent authority to suppress evidence obtained in “willful disobedience of law.” United States v. Payner, 447 USS. 727, 735 n.7 (1980) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)). But it has also cautioned that courts must exercise this power with restraint. /d. Thus, “the court should not exercise its inherent or supervisory power ‘as a substitute for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.’” United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368, 401 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 792 (2d Cir. 1996)). In situations where the Fourth Amendment 12 DOJ-OGR-00004796