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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document307 Filed 06/25/21 Page 20 of 21 entitled to deference. As discussed, the Court is aware of no authority suggesting review of Judge McMahon’s modification order is necessary or appropriate in these circumstances. If necessary, the Court would afford it deference and would not disturb Judge McMahon’s reasoned and supported decision. Maxwell’s reply brief recasts her claim for suppression under Martindell as simply another argument for suppression under due process or the Court’s inherent authority. Because, in her view, the Government did not satisfy the requirements of Martindell, its attempt to modify the protective order violated her due process rights. And because, she alleges, the Government misrepresented facts to Judge McMahon, this Court should exercise its inherent authority to suppress evidence as a sanction for governmental misconduct. The Court is not persuaded. For the reasons set forth above, the Government’s application for modification of the protective order did not violate Maxwell’s due process rights. Due process does not categorically bar an ex parte modification to a protective order, and Judge McMahon found that the Government had shown extraordinary circumstances to do so. To the extent Maxwell seeks suppression based on an alleged misrepresentation to Judge McMahon, for the reasons set forth above, she has not met the high bar for a due process violation or made the required showing under Franks that would entitle her to an evidentiary hearing. Whether Maxwell advances these arguments under Martindell or directly under due process, they do not support suppression. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Government did not violate Maxwell’s constitutional rights when it obtained evidence covered by a protective order in her earlier civil case. It further finds that Maxwell is not entitled to suppression of any evidence or to an 20 DOJ-OGR-00004804