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4.2.12 WC: 191694 There are, of course, some historical low tech antecedents to the current high-tech dangers. During our pre-revolutionary, revolutionary and immediate post-revolutionary era, there were many “radical,” “irresponsible,” “anarchistic and “anonymous” “rabble-rousers” and even “whistle blowers,” “eavesdroppers” and “leakers” who were believed to be endangering the “security” of the government.** “Secret presses” published “anonymous” or pseudononymous screeds, some of which disclosed “secrets” or other “dangerous” information. 99 6¢ The language of the First Amendment would seem to protect these dissidents against any abridgement of their freedom of expression—at least from the United States Government. But our history in this regard has been checkered at best, especially in the context of fear of war. Less than a decade after the ratification of the First Amendment, Congress (the very Congress that was directed to “make no law abridging the freedom of speech) “made” the Alien and Sedition law, which expressly abridged the freedom of speech of dissidents and critics of the Adams Administration. The justification for this repressive legislation was the fear of war with France. During every war or threatened war since, there have been efforts, many quite successful, to abridge the speech of “disloyal,” “unpatriotic,” and “irresponsible” dissenters. The “retail” dangers posed by individual trouble-makers (or even by groups) was, of course, rather meager compared to the “wholesale” dangers currently posed by cyber-“trouble-makers,” such as Julian Assange and Wikileaks. Indeed, even Assange and Wikileaks are somewhat closer to established media than are some others who we know little or nothing about. After all, Wikileaks worked closely with established media, such as the New York Times, The Guardian and other mainstream media. There are generally several levels of vetting before anything is published. It can be argued that Wikileaks has served as a “filter” for material that might otherwise have been published directly on the internet, without any names or other such material having been removed. There are hackers out there who regard Assange as a “sell out” for “tampering with the truth” by excising anything. They would—and do if they can—publish everything they manage to hack. That is why the first line of defense against the disclosure of secrets is to protect the most important secrets from hacking or other means of accessing them by preventive steps. As Assange once told me, “the best way to keep a secret is not to know it.” The United States does a terrible job of protecting its secrets, often giving access to some of the most unstable and irresponsible individuals, while denying security clearance to perfectly loyal and cautious people. Inevitably some secrets will become known to those who have no stake in keeping them secret and an important stake in making them public. That’s why the rule of law, rather than the whim of government officials, is needed to strike the appropriate balance. I may have an opportunity to help strike that balance, because Julian Assange has asked me to consult with him and his British legal team regarding a possible indictment by the United States against him and others. I went to London in March of 2011 to meet with Assange and the lawyers who were then representing him. He was facing the immediate prospect of extradition to Sweden on sexual “6 See Finding Jefferson at pp. _. 124 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017211