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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 310-1 Filed 07/02/21 Page 47 of 80 The decisions below, barring prosecution of the Stipetiches, embodied concern that allowing charges to be brought after George Stipetich had performed his part of the agreement by answering questions about sources of the contraband discovered in his residence would be fundamentally unfair because in answering the questions he may have disclosed information that could be used against him. The proper response to this concern is not to bar prosecution; rather, it is to suppress, at the appropriate juncture, any detrimental evidence procured through the inaccurate representation that he would not be prosecuted. Id. at 1296. Although the Superior Court dismissed this passage from Stipetich as dicta, it found the situation distinguishable in any event inasmuch as former D.A. Castor testified that there was no “agreement” or “quid pro quo” with Cosby, and, therefore, any reliance that Cosby placed upon the district attorney’s promise was unreasonable. Cosby, 224 A.3d at 416-17. The Superior Court concluded that it was bound by the trial court’s factual findings and by its credibility determinations. The trial court had “determined that Mr. Castor’s testimony and, by implication, Attorney Schmitt’s testimony (which was premised upon information he indirectly received from Mr. Castor) were not credible.” /d. at 417. The panel added that the trial court had “found that the weight of the evidence supported its finding that no agreement or grant of immunity was made, and that [Cosby] did not reasonably rely on any overtures by Mr. Castor to that effect when he sat for his civil deposition.” /d. Thus, the Superior Court discerned no error in the trial court’s decision to allow the use of Cosby’s deposition testimony against him at trial.'® i In addition to the Rule 404(b) and non-prosecutions claims, the Superior Court rejected a number of other issues raised by Cosby, including an assertion of improper juror bias, a challenge to an allegedly misleading jury instruction, and a contention that SORNA was unconstitutional. Cosby, 224 A.3d at 396, 421-431. Because those issues are not relevant to the matters before us, we need not discuss them herein. [J-100-2020] - 46 DOJ-OGR-00004859