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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 310-1 Filed 07/02/21 Page 59 of 80 There is no doubt that promises made during plea negotiations or as part of fully consummated plea agreements differ in kind from the unilateral discretion exercised when a prosecutor declines to pursue criminal charges against a defendant. As suggested by the trial court in the present case, such an exercise of discretion is not per se enforceable in the same way that a bargained-for exchange is under contract law. The prosecutor enjoys “tremendous” discretion to wield “the power to decide whether to initiate formal criminal proceedings, to select those criminal charges which will be filed against the accused, to negotiate plea bargains, to withdraw charges where appropriate, and, ultimately, to prosecute or dismiss charges at trial.” Clancy, 192 A.3d at 53. Unless patently abused, this vast discretion is exercised generally beyond the reach of judicial interference. See Stipetich, 652 A.2d at 1295 (noting that “the ultimate discretion to file criminal charges lies in the district attorney”). While the prosecutor’s discretion in charging decisions is undoubtedly vast, it is not exempt from basic principles of fundamental fairness, nor can it be wielded in a manner that violates a defendant's rights. The foregoing precedents make clear that, at a minimum, when a defendant relies to his or her detriment upon the acts of a prosecutor, his or her due process rights are implicated. See, e.g., Santobello, Baird, and Scotland, supra. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article |, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution mandate that all interactions between the government and the individual are conducted in accordance with the protections of due process. See Commonwealth v. Sims, 919 A.2d 931, 941 n.6 (Pa. 2007) (noting that federal and state due process principles generally are understood as operating co-extensively). We have explained that review of a due process claim “entails an assessment as to whether the challenged proceeding or conduct offends some principle of justice so rooted in the [J-100-2020] - 58 DOJ-OGR-00004871