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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 310-1 Filed 07/02/21 Page 69 of 80 We already have determined that Cosby in fact relied upon D.A. Castor’s decision. We now conclude that Cosby’s reliance was reasonable, and that it also was reasonable for D.A. Castor to expect Cosby to so rely. The record establishes without contradiction that depriving Cosby of his Fifth Amendment right was D.A. Castor’s intended result.2’ His actions were specifically designed to that end. The former district attorney may have equivocated or contradicted himself years later with regard to how he endeavored to achieve that result, but there has never been any question as to what he intended to achieve. There can be no doubt that, by choosing not to prosecute Cosby and then 27 The dissent asserts that we have predicated our decision upon the existence of an “unwritten promise,” which was rejected by the trial court’s credibility findings. D.O. at 3. To the contrary. As we explained earlier, we have accepted the trial court’s findings in this regard, and those findings, which are supported by the record, are binding on this Court. See, supra, page 48 (citing O'Rourke, 778 A.2d at 1199 (Pa. 2001)). However, our deference is limited to the factual findings only; we may draw our own inferences therefrom and reach our own legal conclusions. See /n re Pruner's Est., 162 A.2d at 631. Thus, the trial court’s factual finding that no formal bargained-for-exchange, written or unwritten, occurred does not constrain our legal analysis, nor does it in any way serve to immunize D.A. Castor’s actions from constitutional scrutiny. That there was no formal promise does not mean that Cosby no longer had due process rights. The trial court’s credibility finding regarding the existence vel non of a particular promise does not allow us to ignore the remainder of the overwhelming evidence of record. The record firmly establishes that D.A. Castor’s desired result was to strip Cosby of his Fifth Amendment rights. This patent and developed fact stands separate and apart from the trial court’s finding that D.A. Castor never extended a formal promise. The dissent would ignore the undeniable reality that Cosby relied to his detriment upon D.A. Castor’s decision. The dissent does so by shifting the perspective from D.A. Castor’s actions to Cosby’s, focusing in particular upon the fact that Cosby did not record the purported agreement or reduce it to writing. As we note in this opinion, in this context, neither a promise, nor an agreement, nor a contract, nor evidence of reliance derives legal validity only upon being recorded or upon written materialization. The law knows no such prerequisite, and Cosby cannot be punished for failing to comply with a legal requirement that does not exist. The proof of Cosby’s reliance is plain on the face of the record. It is the fact that, upon the advice and assistance of counsel, Cosby sat for four depositions and incriminated himself, obviously a decision made after and in direct reliance upon D.A. Castor’s decision. [J-100-2020] - 68 DOJ-OGR-00004881