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IN RE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 791 Cite as 349 F.Supp.2d_ 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (1) whether the foreign state created the entity for a national purpose; (2) whether the foreign state actively super- vises the entity; (3) whether the foreign state requires the hiring of public em- ployees and pays their salaries; (4) whether the entity holds exclusive rights to some right in the [foreign] country; and (5) how the entity is treated under foreign state law. Id. at 217 (citing Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 846-47 (th Cir.2000) (alteration in original)). The Second Circuit held that the KDIC was an organ of Korea because it was formed by statute and presidential decree; it performs the governmental functions of protecting depositors and promoting finan- cial stability; its directors are appointed by the Ministry of Finance and Economy; its president is appointed by the President of the Republic of Korea; and many of its operations are overseen by the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Id. The banks argued that once the court determined KDIC was an organ of the foreign state, the banks automatically be- came instrumentalities or agencies of the state because KDIC owned a majority of their stock. Id. The Second Circuit reject- ed this argument, finding such a holding would “permit an infinite number of sub- sidiaries to enjoy sovereign immunity, ... would be incompatible with the purpose of the FSIA, which is to grant governmental, not private corporate immunity, and ... would reflect infidelity to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dole Food.” Id. at 218. Accordingly, it reiterated that “‘a subsidiary of an instrumentality is not it- self entitled to instrumentality status’ ... and that ‘only direct ownership of a major- ity of shares by the foreign state satisfies the statutory requirement.” Jd. (quoting Dole Food, 5388 U.S. at 473-74, 123 S.Ct. 1655). The Second Circuit determined the KDIC was an organ of Korea by consider- ing whether it was created and supervised by a foreign state and whether public em- ployees were performing public functions. Id. at 217. Under its reasoning, it would appear the PIF is also an organ. It was created by royal decree, it is supervised by the Kingdom’s Council of Ministers and staffed with government employees. See PIF Charter. Yet, under the “legal characteristics” test, the PIF could qualify as a political subdivision. See Hyatt, 945 F.Supp. at 680. In Hyatt, a court in this district reasoned that a statutory requirement of an agency or instrumentality, as opposed to a political subdivision, is that it is a “separate legal person ... that can func- tion independent of the state.” Jd. at 684. If an entity could sue and be sued, own property, and contract in its own name, it would be considered an agency or instru- mentality and not a political subdivision. Id. at 685. NCB submits the PIF sues and is sued as, and generally holds proper- ty on behalf of, the Ministry of Finance. Al-Wohaibi Aff. 199, 12. NCB argues the Court should employ the “core functions” test outlined in Tran- saero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148 (D.C.Cir.1994), to find that the PIF is the equivalent of the Kingdom. Under this test, if the entity’s core func- tions are governmental, it is considered the state itself. /d. at 153. If its functions are commercial in nature, it is considered an instrumentality. /d. This Court is gov- erned by Second Circuit precedent and finds Filler and Hyatt to be controlling. Even if it were to adopt Transaero, howev- er, the Court finds on the record before it that the PIF’s emphasis on commercial projects precludes a finding that its core functions are governmental in nature. See PIF Charter 12 (noting the PIF’s primary HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017856