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IN RE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 793 Cite as 349 F.Supp.2d_ 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particu- lar transaction or act, rather than by refer- ence to its purpose.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(d). The Supreme Court has explained, “when a foreign government acts, not as a regu- lator of the market, but in the manner of a private player within it, the foreign sover- eign’s actions are ‘commercial’ within the meaning of the FSIA.” Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614, 112 S.Ct. 2160. Courts must in- quire whether the foreign state’s actions “are the type of actions by which a private party engages in trade and traffic or com- merce.” Jd. Gnternal citations omitted). [15] Judge Robertson determined that the commercial activity exception did not apply to the Burnett Plaintiffs’ claims against Prince Sultan and Prince Turki because “the act of contributing to a foun- dation is not within our ordinary under- standing of ‘trade and traffic or commerce’ nor, apparently was it within the contem- plation of ... Congress.” Burnett I, 292 F.Supp.2d at 18 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 94- 1487, at 16, reprinted im 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6615). Thus, the consoli- dated Plaintiffs do not assert that the com- mercial activities exception is applicable to any of the Defendants raising FSIA de- fenses here. This Court adopts Judge Robertson’s reasoning. To the extent any Plaintiffs’ claims are based on a Defen- dant’s contributions to charities, those acts cannot be considered commercial. [16,17] The Federal Plaintiffs allege that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Prince Sultan, and Prince Turki financed terror- ism by contributing to or supporting chari- ties known to support terrorist activities. In these Plaintiffs’ view, this is essentially money laundering and, therefore, a com- mercial activity. See, eg., Federal Plain- tiffs’ Opp. to Motion to Dismiss of Prince Sultan at 18 (citing U.S. v. Goodwin, 141 F.3d 394, 399 (2d Cir.1997)). The Second Circuit noted in Goodwin that “[mloney laundering is a quintessential economic ac- tivity,’ 141 F.3d at 399, but that statement has no bearing here. In Goodwin the court was not deciding whether money laundering is a commercial activity for purposes of the FSIA. /d. (analyzing con- stitutionality of criminal money laundering statute). The Second Circuit has made very clear that, for purposes of the FSIA, a commercial activity must be one in which a private person can engage lawfully. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 797-98 (2d Cir.1984); see also Saudi Ara- bia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 360-62, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 123 L.Ed.2d 47 (1993) (holding detaining and torturing plaintiff is not commercial activity since it “is not the sort of action by which private parties can en- gage in commerce”). Since money laun- dering is an illegal activity, see 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (criminalizing money laundering), it cannot be the basis for applicability of the commercial activities exception. See Lete- hier, 748 F.2d at 798 (holding alleged par- ticipation in an assassination is not a lawful activity and therefore not a commercial activity for purposes of the FSIA). Ac- cordingly, the Court finds that the com- mercial activities exception outlined in § 1605(a)(2) is inapplicable to the allega- tions contained in the Federal complaint against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Prince Sultan, and Prince Turki. 2. State Sponsor of Terrorism [18] Subsection (a)(7) lifts immunity in cases: in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal inju- ry or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provi- sion of material support or resources ... for such an act ... except that the HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017858