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IN RE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 797 Cite as 349 F.Supp.2d_ 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) demonstrating the torts exception outlined in (a)() provides a basis for subject matter jurisdiction here. [20] To fit within the exception out- lined in § 1605(a)(5), the Plaintiffs must come forward with evidence demonstrating the Princes’ or Kingdom’s tortious acts or omissions caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.2* 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5); Virtual Countries, 300 F.3d at 241; Cargill, 991 F.2d at 1016. “Any terrorist act, including the Septem- ber 11 attacks, might have been the natu- ral and probable consequence of knowingly and intentionally providing financial sup- port to al Qaeda, given [the complaints’] allegations that, prior to September 11, al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden had _ pro- claimed their intentions to commit murder- ous terrorist activities against the United States and its citizens, ... and had accom- panied these words with actions by imple- menting, and publicly acknowledging re- sponsibility for, such terrorist schemes as the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Cen- ter, the 1998 attack of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2000 at- tack of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen.” Bur- nett [, 274 F.Supp.2d at 105; see also Ashton Complaint 11 105-108 (1993 World Trade Center attack), 180-136 (embassy bombings), 152-55 (Cole attack); Federal Complaint 177 (alleging Osama Bin Laden established al Qaeda to wage war with the United States). 26. Plaintiffs argue that Judge Robertson held them to an unnecessarily stringent theory of causation and submit that the D.C. Circuit’s subsequent decision in Kilburn v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123 (D.C.Cir.2004), effectively overrules the holding in Burnett IT. See Kilburn, 376 F.3d at 1129 (evaluating a claim under § 1605(a)(7) and holding the requirement for jurisdictional causation was proximate cause). This Court does not read Burnett IT as requiring but-for causation and Defendants agreed at oral ar- gument that the proper inquiry at this stage of a. Prince Sultan and Prince Turki [21] Both Princes are alleged to have tortiously aided and abetted terrorism through their contributions to, and support of, Islamic charities that they knew or should have known were supporting ter- rorist organizations such as al Qaeda.” Additionally, Plaintiffs allege Prince Turki aided and abetted the terrorists by at- tempting to deflect their activities away from Saudi Arabia and by serving as a “facilitator of Osama bin Laden’s network of charities.” Ashton Complaint 1261; Burnett Complaint 1350. Plaintiffs allege both Princes must have known that the United States would have been al Qaeda’s target, making the attacks on September 11 a foreseeable result of the Princes’ ac- tions. [22-24] Pursuant to the Second Cir- cuit’s instruction, the Court must first de- termine whether the Princes’ acts are tor- tious under New York law. Robinson, 269 F.3d at 142. In New York, conspiracy and aiding and abetting are varieties of con- certed action liability. Pittman v. Gray- son, 149 F.8d 111, 122 (2d Cir.1998). There must be “(1) an express or tacit agreement to ‘participate in a common plan or design to commit a tortious act,’ (2) tortious conduct by each defendant, and (8) the commission by one of the defendants, in pursuance of the agreement, of an act that constitutes a tort.” Jd. (quoting the litigation is the presence of proximate causation. See Sept. 14, 2004 Tr. at 121. 27. To the extent that the consolidated Plain- tiffs and the Federal Plaintiffs allege that Prince Sultan and Prince Turki made dona- tions in their personal capacities, see, e.g., Ashton Complaint { 269 (Prince Sultan); Fed- eral Complaint {9451-52 (Prince Turki), those claims are not subject to the FSIA’s protection. The Court will determine wheth- er it has personal jurisdiction over Prince Sultan and Prince Turki in Part II. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017862