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816 years was reasonable). Prince Mohamed correctly submits that his position as an officer of DMI, IICG, and FIBS would not be a basis for jurisdiction over him even if the Court had personal jurisdiction over these entities. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n. 18, 104 S.Ct. 1478, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (984) (“Each defendant’s contacts with the fo- rum State must be assessed individually.”). Finally, Prince Mohamed argues that the conclusory allegation that he participated in a terrorist conspiracy, without specific facts, is insufficient to create personal ju- risdiction over him. [60] The Court agrees that Plaintiffs have not presented a prima facie case of general jurisdiction over Prince Mohamed. In the ten years before the attacks, Prince Mohamed’s contacts with the United States consist of one speech and a handful of investments in the United States through the banks with which he is affiliat- ed. These contacts are not sufficiently “systematic and continuous” to maintain general jurisdiction over a defendant in this action.** See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416, 104 S.Ct. 1868 (holding that purchas- ing in forum, sending personnel for train- ing in forum, and negotiating a contract in forum were not sufficient to establish gen- eral jurisdiction). [61,62] Plaintiffs have alleged that DMI and FIBS might have been involved in the financing of terrorism. See, ¢.g., Ashton Complaint 11 274-75; Ashton Opp. at 25. Even assuming that the Court has personal jurisdiction over these entities, “[t]he mere fact that a corporation is sub- ject to jurisdiction ... does not mean that individual officer may be hauled before New York courts without any showing that the individuals themselves maintained a 36. There is no allegation that Prince Mo- hamed’s investments in the United States are 349 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES presence or conducted business in New York.” Family Internet, 1999 WL 796177, at *4. Plaintiffs have not alleged that Prince Mohamed had any knowledge or involvement in any al Qaeda accounts at any of the banks he chaired. FIBS’ rela- tionship with Al Shamal Islamic Bank, which purportedly knowingly opened ac- counts for al Qaeda operatives, including Osama bin Laden, is too remote in time and proximity to implicate Prince Mo- hamed. To make a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs must either allege personal acts by Prince Mohamed by which he purposefully directed his ac- tivities at the United States by supporting Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, or their ter- rorist agenda, or demonstrate that the acts of the banks he chaired can be imputed to him. Plaintiffs have not met their burden. Thus, Prince Mohamed’s motions to dis- miss the Ashton and Federal complaints as against him for lack of personal jurisdic- tion are granted. 4, Estate of Mohammad Abdullah Aljomaih On May 2, 2003 by Second Addition and Removal of Defendants Pursuant to Case Management Order No. 1 imposed by Judge Robertson, the Burnett Plaintiffs added a defendant “Mohammed Bin Ab- dullah Al-Jomaith.” To date, no specific allegations have been added to the com- plaint with respect to Mr. Aljomaih. In anticipation of what the claims against him might be, before his death Mr. Aljomaih prepared a declaration in support of his motion to dismiss. He was born in Saudi Arabia in 1915 and lived in Riyadh for most of his life. Aljomaih Decl. 13. He and his family began a company in the 1940s that now supplies automobiles, soft drinks, construction equipment, and other related to any alleged conspiracy or to al Qaeda’s activities. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017881