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IN RE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 831 Cite as 349 F.Supp.2d_ 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) complaints presently before the Court do not allege or identify a duty owed to Plain- tiffs by moving Defendants. See Burnett [, 274 F.Supp.2d at 108-09. Accordingly, the negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim. B. Analysis of Claims Against the Moving Defendants [93] While applying the liberal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8, the Court notes that in light of “the extreme nature of the charge of terrorism, fairness re- quires extra-careful scrutiny of Plaintiffs’ allegations as to any particular defendant, to ensure that he-or it-does indeed have fair notice of [the claims].” Jd. at 103-04. 1. Al Rajhi Bank [94] Al Rajhi Bank was founded in 1987 and now has a network of nearly 400 branch offices throughout Saudi Arabia and seventeen worldwide subsidiaries. Burnett Complaint 184. All the banking Defendants are alleged to have “provided essential support to the al Qaeda organiza- tion and operations. The banking Defen- dants in this lawsuit have acted as instru- ments of terror, in raising, facilitating and transferring money to terrorist organiza- tions.” Burnett Complaint 146. Plaintiffs claim that Al Rajhi Bank is “the primary bank for a number of charities that serve as al Qaeda front groups,” including Al Haramain, MWL, WAMY, SJRC, and IIRO. Burnett Complaint 185; Rule 12(e) Statement 131. “Al Rajhi continues to maintain Al Haramain’s accounts despite Al Haramain’s designation on March 11, 2002 as terrorist organizations by both the United States and Saudi Arabian authori- ties.” Rule 12(e) Statement 144. The Burnett Plaintiffs claim Al Rajhi Bank knew or had to know that its depositors, Defendant charities WAMY, MWL, IIRC, and SJRC were material supporters of terrorism. Rule 12(e) Statement 11 44-60. The Burnett Plaintiffs claim that Saudi Arabia has “ineffective and/or rudimentary bank supervisory, anti-money laundering laws and anti-terrorist financing in place.” Rule 12(e) Statement 9972-78. In 1999, William Weschler of the National Security Council and Richard Newcomb of the Of- fice of Foreign Assets Control traveled to Saudi Arabia to warn Al Rajhi Bank and its regulator, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (“SAMA”), “that their financial systems were being manipulated or uti- lized to fund terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda.” Jd. 175. The United States encouraged SAMA to adopt “know your customer” rules. Jd. “Despite these warnings, Al Rajhi failed to adopt even the most minimal standards, [which] resulted in the use of Al Rajhi as an instrument of terror and a material supporter, aider and abettor of al Qaeda and international ter- rorist activities.” Jd. 19 76-77. One of the hijackers on board American Airlines Flight 11, Abdulaziz al-Omari, held an account at Al Rajhi Bank. Burnett Complaint 185; Rule 12(e) Statement { 43. Another hijacker, Mohammed Atta, made a transfer to this account at some time. Rule 12(e) Statement 143. Plaintiffs claim al Qaeda financier Zouaydi asked Abdullah bin Abdul Muhsen al Turki, a counselor to the government of Saudi Arabia, to send money through Al Rajhi. Burnett Com- plaint 19 388, 538. The Burnett Plaintiffs also claim that Al Rajhi Bank has relationships with Hamas and other terrorists. Rule 12(e) State- ment 1961-69. Al Rajhi Bank chose Tex- as-based Infocom to host its website. Jd. 1165, 66. Infocom has provided funding to Hamas and is owned and operated by Hamas leader and designated terrorist, Mousa Marzook. Jd. There have been transfers made to Marzook and Infocom HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017896