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830 leged conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous enough to permit recovery. Stuto, at 827. The attacks on September 11, 2001 were undoubtedly extreme and outrageous. The Court finds that if the Ashton and Burnett Plaintiffs’s allegations sufficiently allege that Defendants sup- ported, aided and abetted, or conspired with the September 11 terrorists, they will have also stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Bur- nett I, 274 F.Supp.2d at 107-08 (analyzing claims under New York law). 7. Trespass [85] The Federal Plaintiffs bring a claim for trespass on the theory that De- fendants assisted and encouraged those who intentionally entered the World Trade Center property. New York courts de- scribe this cause of action as “the interfer- ence with a person’s right to possession of real property either by an unlawful act or a lawful act performed in an unlawful man- ner.” N.Y. State Natl Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1839, 1361 (2d Cir.1989) (citing Ivancic v. Olmstead, 66 N.Y.2d 349, 352, 497 N.Y.S.2d 326, 488 N.E.2d 72 (1985)). To the extent that the Federal Plaintiffs sufficiently plead that Defen- dants acted in concert with the September 11 hijackers, they may proceed with this claim. Wantanabe Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 01 Civ. 10187(LAK), 2003 WL 22862646, at *4 (S.D.N-Y. Dec. 3., 2003) (citing Pittman, 149 F.3d at 122-28). 8. Negligence [86-88] In New York, a plaintiff may establish negligent infliction of emotional distress under the bystander or direct duty theory. Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 421 (2d Cir.2000). Under the by- stander theory, “a defendant’s conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to a plaintiff and such 349 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about injuries to the plaintiff in conse- quence of shock or fright resulting from his or her contemporaneous observation of serious physical injury or death inflicted by the defendant’s conduct on a member of the plaintiff's immediate family in his or her presence.” Bovsun v. Sanper, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 223-24, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357, 461 N.E.2d 848 (1984). Under the direct duty theory, a plaintiff suffers emotional dis- tress caused by “defendant’s breach of a duty which unreasonably endangered [plaintiffs] own physical safety.” Mortise v. United States, 102 F.3d 693, 696 (2d Cir.1996). [89-92] To establish a claim for negli- gence under New York law, “a plaintiff must show that the defendant owed the plaintiff a cognizable duty of care, that the defendant breached that duty, and that the plaintiff suffered damages as a proximate cause of that breach.” King v. Crossland Savings Bank, 111 F.3d 251, 259 @d Cir. 1997). The most basic element of a negli- gence claim is the existence of a duty owed to plaintiffs by defendants. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co. 248 N.Y. 339, 342, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); see also Burnett I, 274 F.Supp.2d at 108 (dismissing negligence claims against Defendant Al Haramain Is- lamic Foundation because complaint failed to allege or identify any duty owed to Plaintiffs). Banks do not owe non-custom- ers a duty to protect them from the inten- tional torts of their customers. Renner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 98 Civ. 926(CSH), 1999 WL 47239, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1999) (citing cases); Burnett [, 274 F.Supp.2d at 109 (“Plaintiffs offer no support, and we have found none, for the proposition that a bank is liable for injuries done with money that passes through its hands in the form of deposits, withdrawals, check clearing services, or any other routine banking service.”). The HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017895