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IN RE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 829 Cite as 349 F.Supp.2d_ 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) recruiting donations to the Holy Land Foundation, a known supporter of Hamas, distributing pro-Hamas literature, and fea- turing pro-Hamas speakers at their meet- ings); see also Burnett [, 274 F.Supp.2d at 107 (noting the complaint in Bowm was quite specific in its allegation of a causal link). Under a conspiracy theory, the Plaintiffs have to allege that the Defen- dants were involved in an agreement to accomplish an unlawful act and that the attacks of September 11 were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of that conspira- cy. See Bowm IIT, 340 F.Supp.2d at 895 (framing analysis as what plaintiffs have to prove to succeed on summary judgment). Plaintiffs do not have to allege that Defen- dants knew specifically about the Septem- ber 11 attacks or that they committed any specific act in furtherance of that attack. Id. 5. Wrongful Death and Survival [81] New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law governs Plaintiffs’ claims of wrongful death and survival. “The per- sonal representative ... of a decedent who is survived by distributees may maintain an action to recover damages for a wrong- ful act, neglect or default which caused the decedent’s death against a person who would have been liable to the decedent by reason of such wrongful conduct if death had not ensued.” N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts § 54.1 (McKinney 2002); see also N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts § 11-3.2(b) (McKinney 2002) (outlining survival claim: “No cause of action for injury to person or property is lost because of the death of the person in whose favor the cause of action existed. For any injury an action may be brought or continued by the personal rep- resentative of the decedent.”). According- ly, the Court finds that if Plaintiffs are personal representatives and their allega- tions sufficiently allege that Defendants supported, aided and abetted, or conspired with the September 11 terrorists, they will have also stated claims for wrongful death and survival. 6. Assault and Battery and Inten- tional Infliction of Emotional Dis- tress [82] The Federal Plaintiffs bring claims of assault and battery and inten- tional infliction of emotional distress. The Burnett and Ashton Plaintiffs also allege claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The statute of limitations for assault and battery and intentional inflic- tion of emotional distress is one year. Holmes v. Lorch, 329 F.Supp.2d 516, 523 (S.D.N-Y.2004); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2150) (McKinney 2002). The Federal Plaintiffs filed their complaint on September 10, 2008, nearly two years after September 11, 2001. Accordingly, their assault and bat- tery and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are dismissed against the SAAR Network and Arab Bank. [83, 84] “Under New York law, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis- tress requires a showing of () extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent to cause, or reckless disregard of a substan- tial probability of causing, severe emotion- al distress; (8) a causal connection be- tween the conduct and the injury; and (4) severe emotional distress.” Stuto v. Fle- ishman, 164 F.3d 820, 827 @d Cir.1999) (citing Howell v. New York Post Co. 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699 (1993)). “ ‘Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atro- cious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” Jd. (quoting Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 122, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350, 612 N.E.2d 699). Courts are to determine whether the al- HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017894