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In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F.Supp.2d 539 (2005) 10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 789 at that address, or elsewhere.” *570 (Burnett Compl. J 262; Ashton Compl. § 334.) The complaints further allege that many of the “SAAR Network” organizations’ offices in Herndon were raided im March 2002 as part of Operation Greenquest to investigate “potential money laundering and tax evasion activities and their ties to terrorist groups such as ... al Qaeda as well as individual terrorists ... (including) Osama bin Laden.” (Burnett Compl. J 263; Ashton Compl. § 335.) As noted above, Plaintiffs claim that the entity Defendants are among numerous co-conspirators, material sponsors, and/or aiders and abettors of the SAAR Network. (Burnett Compl. § 267; Ashton Compl. § 339.) The Plaintiffs also refer the Court to their allegations regarding charity sponsors of terror. (See, e.g., Burnett Compl. J¥ 150-53 (alleging, for example, that charity Defendants “are used as terrorist fronts, to mask money transfers and provide cover for terrorist operatives”).) Additionally, the Ashton complaint claims that IIIT received its “operating expenses” from SAAR and “in turn financed two Florida charitable organizations accused of being cells for Islamic Jihad in Florida.” Ud. § 579.) Unlike the SAAR Network entities whose motions to dismiss the Federal complaint the Court considered in its previous opinion and order, see Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F.Supp.2d at 822—23, these Defendants do not dispute that this Court has personal jurisdiction over them. Although each of these moving Defendants filed a separate motion to dismiss, their arguments in favor of dismissal are similar.’ They argue that, even “assum[ing] that plaintiffs have stated a claim against the “SAAR Network,’ ” (see, e.g., African Muslim Agency’s Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 3, n.1) the complaints must be dismissed because they contain only conclusory allegations that they are “co-conspirator[s], material sponsor[s], and/or aider[s] and abettor[s] of the SAAR Network.” (Burnett Compl. J 267; Ashton Compl. § 339.) Further, they argue that the complaints must be dismissed because they do not allege that they donated any money improperly, or with the knowledge that it would be given to Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, or to any other charity allegedly funneling money to terrorists. 38] Plaintiffs offer the legal conclusion that the SAAR Network entities conspired with the SAAR Network. These Defendants, however, have no notice of the factual grounds on which Plaintiffs’ claims of conspiracy are based. See Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1271 (explaining Swierkiewicz does not permit bare conclusory allegations without notice of the factual grounds on which they purport to be based); see also Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F.Supp.2d 117, 125 (E.D.N.Y.2000) (noting the Second Circuit “has dismissed complaints which plead WESTLAW conspiracy in vague or conclusory terms and which do not allege specific instances of misconduct in furtherance of the conspiracy”); Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 534 (2d Cir.1993) (explaining that on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “legal conclusions, deductions or opinions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness”) (internal quotations omitted)). The Burnett complaint against African Muslim Agency, Grove Corporate, Heritage Education Trust, International Institute of Islamic Thought, Mar—Jac Investments, Mar—Jac Poultry, Reston Investments, Safa Trust, *571 and York Foundation is therefore dismissed without prejudice. For the same reasons, the Ashton complaint against Mar—Jac Poultry is dismissed without prejudice. 3°l The Ashfon complaint alleges one action by IIIT in support of its claims—that it allegedly financed two charitable organizations in Florida accused of being Islamic Jihad cells. The complaint does not allege that INT knew these charities were Islamic Jihad cells or whether and how these cells participated in or contributed to al Qaeda’s agenda of terror. See Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1011-12 (making donations to an alleged terrorist group, without “knowledge of and intent to further payee’s violent criminal acts,” cannot sustain cause of action). Accordingly, the Ashton complaint against HIT is dismissed without prejudice. 4°1 In support of the claim that Mar—Jac Poultry is a material sponsor of terrorism, Plaintiffs allege two acts: first, that it donated money to African Muslim Agency, which the Plaintiffs clatm was later “laundered,” and second, that it donated money to unnamed SAAR Network entities, which was later forwarded to al Qaeda. (See Federal RICO Statement Applicable to SAAR Network Entities at 5(f) and Ex. A.) The RICO claim against Mar—Jac Poultry is dismissed because it is not alleged that Mar—Jac had any role in directing an enterprise, see Redtail Leasing, Inc., 1997 WL 603496, at *5. The Federal complaint does not provide Mar—Jac Poultry with notice as to how it could be liable for the terrorist attacks. See Boim IT, 291 F.3d at 1012 (“To hold the defendants liable for donating money without knowledge of the donee’s intended criminal use of the funds would impose strict liability. Nothing in the language of the statute or its structure or history supports that formulation.”). Mar—Jac’s motion to dismiss the Federal complaint is therefore granted. 2. Executives HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017929