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In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F.Supp.2d 539 (2005) 10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 789 reconsideration of those decisions. A. Standard 441 45] A motion for reconsideration is appropriate where a court overlooks “controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion ... and which, had they been considered, might have reasonably altered the result before the court.” Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90 F.Supp.2d 390, 392 (S.D.N.Y.2000); see also Shrader v. CSX Transp. Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.1995) (“The standard for granting a motion [for reconsideration] is strict, and ... will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked....”). A motion for reconsideration may also be granted to “correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Doe v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 789 (2d Cir.1983). B. The Court Will Consider NCB’s Personal Jurisdiction Defense First NCB offers two bases for reconsideration. First, NCB argues that even if the Court becomes assured of its subject matter and personal jurisdiction over NCB, Plaintiffs’ claims are doomed because the Court dismissed similar claims against Al Rajhi Bank, Saudi American Bank, and Arab Bank. NCB contends that Center for Reproductive Law & Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183, 194-95 (2d Cw.2002), supports its theory that the Court does not need to establish jurisdiction over NCB because the Court’s dismissal of other Saudi banks “foreordains” NCB’s dismissal on 12(b)(6) grounds. Alternatively, NCB urges the Court to limit this litigation’s intrusion on Saudi Arabia and postpone resolution of its FSIA immunity defense until after the personal jurisdiction question is resolved. The Ashton and Burnett Plaintiffs argue that the Court should not consider NCB’s reliance on Bush because it was not raised i NCB’s original motion to dismiss. Moreover, they are adamant that jurisdictional questions must be resolved first. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 LEd2d 210 (1998) (“The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter springs from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States and is inflexible and without exception.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). And in WESTLAW Plaintiffs’ view, the subject matter jurisdiction question must be resolved before the Court addresses personal jurisdiction. See Reiss v. Societe Centrale Du Groupe Des Assurances Nationales, 235 F.3d 738, 746 (2d Cir.2000) (“The initial question to be answered in this case is not whether there is personal jurisdiction within the meaning of the New York [C.P.L.R.] but whether there is subject matter jurisdiction within the meaning of the [FSIA].”). Plaintiffs submit that it would be inefficient to separate the personal jurisdiction discovery from the FSIA discovery since the two inquiries are related. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Court’s rulings on the other Saudi banks’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions cannot apply to NCB because the allegations against the various banks are not identical. In Bush, following the Supreme Court’s instructions in Steel Co., the district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after finding plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. On appeal, the Second Circuit found the case “exceptional,” because twelve years earlier it had “entertained and rejected, on the merits, the same constitutional challenge to the provision at issue.” Bush, 304 F.3d at 186; *574 see also Planned Parenthood Fed. of Am. v. Agency of Int’] Devi, 915 F.2d 59 (2d Cir.1990) (rejecting same constitutional challenge to same governmental provision). It explained two exceptions to the general rule that courts “ordinarily ... are not to assume the existence of jurisdiction in favor of reaching an ‘easier’ merits issue.” Bush, 304 F.3d at 193 (quoting Fidelity Partners, Inc. v. First Trust, Co. of N.Y., 142 F.3d 560, 565 (2d Cir.1998)). The only exception relevant here is “in those ‘particular circumstances’ where the outcome on the merits has been ‘foreordained’ by another case such that the ‘jurisdictional question could have no effect on the outcome,’ provided the court ‘does not use the pretermission of the jurisdictional question as a device for reaching a question of law that otherwise would have gone unaddressed.’ ” Bush, 304 F.3d at 194 (quoting Stee/ Co., 523 U.S. at 98, 118 S.Ct. 1003). The exception stems from Secretary of Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676, 94 S.Ct. 3039, 41 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1974), in which the Supreme Court dismissed a _ constitutional challenge to a governmental provision on the merits before reaching the jurisdiction question because the Court had earlier rejected a similar constitutional challenge to the same provision in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 LEd.2d 439 (1974). See Bush, 304 F.3d at 194 (describing Avrech and Parker ). Accordingly, in Bush, the Second Circuit skipped the initial-and “novel”—standing question because that analysis would have been rendered “advisory” by “a controlling decision HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017931