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fracturing of ancient China during the Spring and Autumn era or in the Roman
Empire in the age of the Caesars. Our current shifting — that tap, tap on every
nation’s politics, media, and economics - isn’t really so unpredictable after all. 242
You may know the old saw of military parade evaluation: That the more magnificent
a nation’s uniforms are the weaker it’s army usually is. But the gold-braided
admirals of some three-ship navy reflect a very human need for security, and
particularly for a self-decided feeling of security. Every nation has it’s own foreign
affairs aims. Each cherishes a certain national image, memories of military glory and
of “interests” inseparable from culture or identity. The goals of the French and the
Turks, for instance, each evoke an encyclopedia of history, tradition and politics.
Uneasiness in Paris about capitalism and immigration, for instance; or Anrka’s
worry about ethnic division, fundamentalisms, and the creeping nuclear progress of
their neighbors. Our era’s revolutionary logic will shape choices in every nation
differently. But I'd like here to discuss American foreign policy. America plays a
central role in world order now. The country’s leading position makes her, to some
degree, an unavoidable gatekeeper. In the Napoleonic era, nearly every revolution
or war could be tied to energies emanating from Paris. During the Cold War most
puzzles of politics or geography might be framed in terms of a zero-sum competition
with the USSR. In our own age, we'll find most every problem links to networks and
their new logic. And - for now at least - to America. Thomas Paine’s memorable 250
year-old assessment, that “The cause of America is the cause of all mankind,”
touches this linked universalism in a way he never could have imagined.
“Betweeness” or “Centrality” are the way network science labels and measures such
a role. Just how essential is a certain nation or trading platform or point? The
networks of America won't, in the future, be the only networks. They will be less
“between”. But they will be, always and indelibly, the first reference for design.
If the traditional aim of American foreign policy was to prevent the emergence of a
challenger that threatened the country directly, or that might fence off and
manipulate Asia or Europe or Latin America against Washington’s aims, the concern
now is different: Mastery of topological destiny. There are those who observe, as an
American think tank noted in 2015, “Today the United States faces no existential
threat.”243 This is wrong. The emergence and shape of networks is just such a
danger. Security, the great foreign policy theorist Andre Wolfers once wrote, is “the
absence of threats to acquired values.”**4 The networks around us, as we've seen,
are demolishing older values. Often because we want them to. Any revolutionary
technology unbuttons an older order this way. But we now approach this
destabilized world with a sort of wideyed panic. Control terrorism, manage climate
242 Our current shifting: See also Lars-Erik Cederman, T. Camber Warren, and
Didier Sornette, “Testing Clausewitz: Nationalism, Mass Mobilization, and the
Severity of War” International Organization 65, Fall 2011, pp 605-38
243 “America faces no existential threat”: See James Dobbins, et al. Choices for
America in a Turbulent World (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015) xiv
244 In his classic essay: Andre Wolfers, “National Security’ as an ambigious
symbol”, Political Science Quarterly, 67 (1952) 485
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