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Freedom House Eastern Europe, and military dictatorships elsewhere, there was an explosion of newspapers, radio and television stations, and other independent media with diverse editorial policies. But the internet in particular was seen as an irresistible force that could render censorship of any kind impossible. In 2000, President Bill Clinton compared China's efforts to control inter- net content to “trying to nail Jell-O to the wall.”” Third, a growing number of experts began to identify anew instigator of democratic change in global civil society. Unlike the “peoples movements’ of earlier decades, in which well-known leaders mobilized mass demonstrations and often insurrectionary violence with the goal of overthrowing despotic regimes, the phenomenon that was labeled civil society consisted of organizations that were often committed to a single cause or a few causes united by a particular theme. Most activists were young, with little prior involvement in politics, and many regarded themselves as part of a global effort to advance goals like reducing carbon emissions, empowering women, or fighting corruption. In a prescient 1997 article, Jessica T. Mathews predict- ed that in the future global civil society would be the triggering force behind liberal change.® She suggested that in many cases civil society organizations would play a more important role than governments. Her words seemed prescient in light of later events in Serbia, where student activists organized a campaign that eventually brought about the downfall of President Slobodan Milogevié in 2000, and in Ukraine, where young reformers played a pivotal role in ensuring that the 2004 elections were not stolen through fraud. In declaring that dictatorships or even authoritarian methods were destined to succumb to this triad of new social forces, commentators were also express- ing optimism about the universal appeal of liberal values. The decade after the end of the Cold War was a heyday for democratic ideas and norms. It was increasingly expected that countries would not only hold elections, but that their elections would meet international standards and be judged “free and fair.” There was also an expectation that political parties would be able to compete on a reasonably level playing field, that opposition leaders would not be harassed or arrested, and that minorities would be able to pursue their agendas through normal political channels and not find it necessary to wage perpetual protest campaigns. However, there were nagging questions. It remained unclear whether most societies would have access to multiple sources of political ideas, multiple interpreta- tions of the news, and open scholarly inquiries about the past. Would there be honest judicial proceedings, especially in cases with political implications? Would property rights be secure? Beyond these primarily domestic issues, there was another series of questions related to individual governments’ relations with their neighbors and the rest of the world. The end of the Cold War had brought a peace dividend, both financial and psychological, for all sides. At the time, most assumed that peace would prove durable. But would the general decline in military budgets hold? Would the new national boundaries that divided the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia be sustainable? As modern authoritarianism has taken root and ex- panded its influence, the answers to these questions are increasingly negative. 1. Freedom in the World 2016 (New York: Freedom House, 2016), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/free- dom-world-2016. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ceylan Yeginsu, “Turks Feud Over Change in Education,” New York Times, December 8, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/ world/europe/erdogan-pushes-ottoman-language-classes-as-part-of-tradtional-turkish-values.html. 5. Eleanor Albert, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 14, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/ china/shanghai-cooperation-organization/p10883. 6. “Freedom in the World at 41,” in Freedom in the World 2014 (New York: Freedom House, 2014), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/ default/files/Freedom%20in%20the%20World%202014%20Booklet.pdf. 7. “Chinas Internet: A Giant Cage,” Economist, April 6, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21574628-internet- was-expected-help-democratise-china-instead-it-has-enabled. 8. Jessica T. Mathews, “Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 1997), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1997-01-01/ power-shift. www.freedomhouse.org HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019243

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Filename HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019243.jpg
File Size 0.0 KB
OCR Confidence 85.0%
Has Readable Text Yes
Text Length 4,627 characters
Indexed 2026-02-04T16:37:34.388790